Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 67

Issue 2

Article 5

Spring 3-1-2010

The Story of Us: Resolving the Face-Off Between Autobiographical
Speech and Information Privacy
Sonja R. West

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Sonja R. West, The Story of Us: Resolving the Face-Off Between Autobiographical Speech and
Information Privacy, 67 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 589 (2010).
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol67/iss2/5
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington and
Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law
Review by an authorized editor of Washington and Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more
information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.

The Story of Us: Resolving the Face-Off
Between Autobiographical Speech and
Information Privacy
Sonja R. West*

Abs tract
Increasinglymore "ordinary"Americans are choosing to share their life
experiences with a public audience. In doing so, however, they are revealing
more than their own personal stories; they are exposing private information
about others as well. The faceoff between autobiographicalspeech and
informationprivacy is coming to a head, and our legal system is not prepared
to handle it.
In a prior article, I established that autobiographicalspeech is a unique
and importantcategory of speech that is at risk of being undervaluedunder
current law. This Article builds on my earlier work by addressing the
emerging conflict between autobiographicalspeech and informationprivacy.
Both interestsfoster personalautonomy and encourageparticipationinpublic
debate, and both interests seek to give individuals the power to control i,
when, and how their personal information is shared with the world. The
conflict between speech and privacy has proven to be a pervasive and
especially difficult problem, andpriorattempts to balance the two intereststhrough the lens ofproperty or contract law-havefailed.
In this Article, I propose a new, workable framework to resolve the
conflict by reexamining the tort of public disclosure of privatefacts. This
analysis reveals that the current overemphasis on whether the information
disclosed was "newsworthy" is misplaced and likely unconstitutional The
tort's protection of individual privacy, however, can be reconciled with the
*
Assistant Professor of Law, the University of Georgia School of Law. I would like to
thank Dan Coenen, Paul Heald, Lori Ringhand, and Daniel Bodansky for their helpful
comments. Early versions of this article benefited from presentations at the Southeastern
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First Amendment by interpretingthe "offensiveness" element to include an
examination of the purpose of the disclosure. A number of courts have
implicitly adopted this view and, in doing so, are reflecting community norms
that disclosuresmadefor sufficientjustifications-suchas sharingnewsworthy
information or, Isubmit, engaging in autobiographicalspeech-arenot highly
offensive. Disclosures made for purely voyeuristic reasons, however, are
highly offensive.
This 'Yustified disclosure" approachencompasses community norms and
expectations in a way that is more predictableandfairerthan otherproposed
frameworks. It further promises to be applicable not just to the conflict
between autobiographicalspeech and informationprivacy but also to broader
disputes involving privacy and speech.
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As she continued to read, Theresa says, she ...could not believe that
Burroughs had revealed details about events in her life that had occurred 20
years earlier and had been horribly painful for her-so painful that she had
spent years in therapy trying to overcome them and had never told her own
daughter about them.
She continued to read that night, occasionally stopping because she simply
could not bear to read anymore ... . Sometimes she had to stop to run to
the bathroom and vomit. "Ihave never vomited so much in my life," she
says.
-Account of Theresa Turcotte discussing her reaction to reading the
the time
memoir Running with Scissors' by Augusten Burroughs about
2
when Burroughs, as a teenager, lived with Turcotte's family.
not my mother's story and it's not the family's
This is my stor....
story, and they may remember things differently and they may choose to not
remember certain things, but I will never forget what happened to me, ever,
and I have the scars from it and I wanted to rip those scars off of me.
.It's

3
-Augusten Burroughs, describing why he wrote Running with Scissors.

I Introduction
4
Emily Gould spent years chronicling her daily life and the people in it.
Her personal journals, however, were not diaries that she kept locked and
hidden under her mattress. Rather, Emily was a modern kind of diarist; she
was a blogger.5 She shared her personal life in one of the most public ways

1. AUGUsTEN BURROUGHS, RUNNING

WITH SCISSORS:

A MEMOIR (2002).

2. Buzz Bissinger, Ruthless with Scissors, VANI= FAIR, Jan. 2007, at 104, 106.
3. Id at 108.
4. See Emily Gould, Exposed, N.Y. TIMES, May 25,2008, (Magazine), at 32 (explaining
the development of Gould's blog and its effect on herself, her friends, and her family).
5. See id ("Back in 2006,.... almost every day I updated my year-old blog, Emily
Magazine, to let a few hundred people know what I was reading and watching and thinking
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possible-by posting it on the Internet. Writing about her blogging experiences
for the New York Times, Emily explained how she and her then-boyfriend,
Henry, would argue relentlessly about her hobby of revealing details about their
lives for all to see-.etails that he wished to remain private .6 "1told him that
writing, especially writing about myself and my surroundings, was a
fundamental part of my personality, and that if he wanted to remain in my life,
he would need to reconcile himself to being part of the world I described."'
Henry, however, saw things quite differently: "His point of view was just as
extreme: I wasn't generously sharing my thoughts; I was compulsively seeking
gratification from strangers at the expense of the feelings of someone I actually
knew and loved." 8
The feelings described by Emily and Henry illustrate the potential problem
that arises when one person desires to tell her personal story yet, in doing so,
publicly reveals private information about another person. The tension here is
obvious. While Henry was a major character in Emily's life story, the story
clearly was not hers alone-it was theirs. From Emily's point of view she was
telling "The Story of Me," but from Henry's she was telling "The Story of Us."
The environment in which this conflict plays out, has been radically
shaped by technological changes; the Internet now supplies an accessible and
affordable means for almost any speaker to broadcast her story to the world.
This modem ability to reach a broad audience is liberating for the speaker. But
it also means, as Daniel Solove has observed, that "[w]ithout warning, anyone
can broadcast another's unguarded moments or times of youthful awkwardness
to an audience of millions." 9 Emily viewed her blogging as a natural extension
of her innate desire to share:
Of course, some people have always been more naturally inclined toward
oversharing than others. Technology just enables us to overshare on a
different scale. Long before I had a blog, I found ways to broadcast my
thoughts-to gossip about myself, tell my own secrets, tell myself and
others the ongoing story of my life.'0

about.").
6. See id ("[W]hat this meant was that he was never particularly thrilled to be written
about. Sometimes he was enraged.").
7. Id
8. Id
9. Daniel I. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justi4fying Privacy Protections
Against Disclosure, 53 DuKE L.J. 967, 969 (2003).
10. Gould, supra note 4, at 32.
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The appeal of broadcasting personal information on the Internet might be
baffling to many, but to others the lure of public self-exposure is irresistible.
Emily explained her desire to blog by stating:
I think most people who maintain blogs are doing it for some of the same
reasons I do: they like the idea that there's a place where a record of their
existence is kept-a house with an always-open door where people who are
looking for you can check on you, compare notes with you and tell you
what they think of you. 1
In a prior article, 12 I made the case that truthful autobiographical speech
like Emily's plays a valuable role in our public discourse that is at risk of legal
underprotection. 13 By truthfully speaking about their life experiences, I argued,
autobiographical speakers add crucial information to the public debate that
enhances our democracy.'14 At the same time, strong protections for the
individual right of autobiographical speech facilitates the autonomy and selffulfillment of the speaker.'15 These important values of autobiographical
speech, however, are not currently protected by courts'16 and, prior to my article,
were not recognized by legal scholars. These oversights have produced a
system in which the life stories of average citizens are at risk of being
silenced.'17 For these reasons, I concluded that the free speech values of
autobiographical speech need to be recognized and given strong constitutional
protection.1
Consider Emily. When she shares her life experiences, openly and
truthfully, she is adding something special to the public discourse. What she
shares differs greatly from reports of the professional journalist or the seasoned
nonfiction writer. Yet the different, highly personal perspective that Emily
offers is precisely what makes her speech distinctly valuable. In addition to her
individual interest in speaking openly about her life, Emily provides a front-line
11. Id.
12. See Sonja R. West, The Story of Me: The Underprotection of Autobiographical
Speech, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 905, 905-67 (2006) (explaining the constitutional value of
autobiographical speech and arguing that it currently lacks significant protection from statutes
and courts).
13. See id at 905 ("An analysis applying the various goals of free speech protection to
autobiographical speech establishes that it occupies an exceptional place in the public
discourse ....
14. Id. at 926.
15. Id. at 928.
16. See id at 967 ("[T~he narrow aim [of this article] is to bring overdue recognition to a
category of valuable speech that heretofore has gone unnoticed by courts and scholars.").
17. Id. at 944.
18. Idat 967.

594

5467 WASH &LEE L. REV 589 (2010)

account of the human condition. Our society and our democracy benefit from
learning about the personal experiences of people like Emily and from the calls
to action that information provokes.'19 As Eugene Volokh has observed, speech
about everyday experiences "indirectly but deeply affects the way we view the
world, deal with others, evaluate their moral claims on us, and even vote; and
its effect is probably greater than that of most of the paintings we see or the
20
editorials we read.",

Thus, if Emily wishes to tell what she described as "the ongoing story of
my life",2 '1by announcing to the world that "this is what I did," or "this is what
happened to me," it should be her right to do so. It is disturbing and
constitutionally suspect to give anyone, including the government or her exboyfriend empowered by the government, censorship power over her desire to
proclaim, "Iwas here."
But there are always two sides to every story. In this case, that other side
is Henry's. He is not disputing the truth of what Emily is saying about the lives
they share; indeed, his objections to her speech arise precisely because what she
seeks to reveal is true. Henry does not want his private personal information
broadcast to the world.2 His desire for privacy is understandable and shared by
many. Judge Richard Posner has stated that the desire for privacy "is a
mysterious but deep fact about human personality" and that "[e]ven people who
have nothing rationally to be ashamed of can be mortified by the publication of
intimate details of their life.",23 Thus while it is troubling to give Henry the
ability to silence Emily, it is a matter of no small concern that Emily is in a
position to destroy Henry's personal zone of privacy. Henry's right to privacy
is real and important, and it stands in direct conflict with Emily's right to tell
her story.
The general conflict between freedom of speech and the value of privacy
is a familiar one, as courts and commentators have struggled with it for more
than a century. 24 The Supreme Court rightly has observed that "[tlhe face-off is
19. See id. at 967 ("[Autobiographical speech] respects human autonomy. It comments on
the human condition. It introduces a diverse society to itself. It records individual lives and
collective histories. It empowers the powerless. It promotes understanding and tolerance. It
preserves democracy.").
20. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling

Implications ofa Right to Stop Peoplefrom Speaking About You, 52

STAN. L. R~v.

1049, 1093

(2000).
21. Gould, supra note 4, at 32.
22. See id. ("Henry, seemingly alone among our generation, went out of his way to keep
his online presence minimal.").
23. Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1229 (7th Cu. 1993).
24. See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy,4 HARV.
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apparent' whenever privacy and speech come into conflict.2 The problem only
deepens when the face-off concerns truthfulI autobiographical speech and
information privacy. Cases that involve such speech, after all, involve competing
interests that are closely aligned: the right of both the speaker and the subject to
have control over if, when, and how personal information about their lives is
revealed to the public. What is more, while the personal character of the speech
gives it a specialized and intensified communicative value, that same personal
character creates a heightened threat to the privacy interests of others. When
Warren and Brandeis first envisioned the right of privacy as a shield against
personal disclosures, they depicted it as a right to secure "to each individual the
right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and
emotions shall be communicated to others."2 7 This portrayal of the right to
privacy, however, just as accurately describes the right of the autobiographical
speaker. Thus, the face-off between autobiographical speech and information
privacy presents a direct conflict-either the speaker is silenced and thus loses
control over sharing her story, or the speaker is free and the subject of the speech
loses control of the disclosure of private information about him.
My analysis of how to resolve this conflict unfolds in three parts. In Part HI,
this Article briefly reviews the importance of truthful autobiographical speech and
the risk it faces of legal underprotection. Then it probes the conflict that emerges
when autobiographical speech is pitted against the right of information privacy
and rejects the argument proposed by some scholars that the First Amendment
rights of the speaker always must prevail over the competing privacy interests. In
Part III, this Article considers the most prominent frameworks that have been
proposed by others for balancing the competing speech and privacy interestsproperty law and implied contracts or duty of confidentiality. While these
frameworks draw in creative ways from other areas of law, a closer analysis
ultimately concludes that neither effectively deals with the challenges of this
conflict. Finally, Part IV proposes a new approach for resolving the conflict
between autobiographical speech and information privacy. Focusing on the tort
of public disclosure leads to the conclusion that there has been an overemphasis
on the "newsworthy" exception.2
This interpretation of the tort is likely
unconstitutional because it fails to protect non-newsworthy yet constitutionally
L. REv. 193 (1890) (describing the lengthy development of the right to privacy).
25. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 489 (1975).
26. Id.
27. Warren & Brandeis, supranote 24, at 198.
28. See, e.g., Michaels v. Internet Entm't Group, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 839 (C.D. Cal.
1998) ("Both the public disclosure and intrusion torts are subject to a newsworthy privilege,
which protects the First Amendment freedom to report on matters of public concern .. 1)
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valuable speech like autobiographical speech. This Article argues, however, that
both the tort and the privacy interest it seeks to protect can be preserved by
reexamining the "offensiveness" element of the tort. This analysis reveals that
there are two purposes of the offensiveness inquiry: to assess the nature of the
information revealed and to examine the reason for the disclosure. Reflecting
community norms as to what is "highly offensive" to a reasonable person, courts
adopting this dual view have held that it is not highly offensive to reveal
information if the disclosure is done for a sufficient reason.2 Sharing information
because it is newsworthy or, I submit, because it furthers an autobiographical
purpose, is a sufficient justification. Disclosing personal information purely for a
voyeuristic thrill, however, is not. Adopting this "justified disclosure" approach
rescues the tort from a potentially fatal constitutional flaw while providing a more
workable framework for analyzing speech-versus-privacy conflicts. Because truly
autobiographical speech, whether or not "newsworthy" under traditional
standards, serves important informative fuinctions, this Article concludes by
arguing that this kind of speech should be aggressively protected. Courts should
examine speech to determine if it is genuinely autobiographical and if the
information it includes is meaningfully linked to the autobiographical nature of
the speech. This Article also proposes a limiting definition of autobiographical
speech that focuses on the speaker's intent and that requires autobiographical
speakers to shield the identity of others unless disclosure is necessary to the
telling of one's life story. This approach protects the fundamental constitutional
right to engage in autobiographical speech 30 while still according due weight to
the important and competing privacy interest in a way that is in line with the case
law and more predictable and fairer than other proposals.
H. Exploring the Conflict Between AutobiographicalSpeech and Information
Privacy
A. AutobiographicalSpeech is Worthy of Protection
In a prior article, I offered an in-depth argument that truthful
autobiographical speech deserves greater protection than courts and
commentators now recognize .3 For centuries, this form of speech has been
29. See, e.g., Perkins v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 635 A.2d 783, 792 (Conn. 1993)
(finding that it is not highly offensive to disclose the sick leave records of a public school
psychologist to the local taxpayers association because the association has a sufficient reason to
verify her compensation).
30. See generally West, supra note 12.
3 1. Id.at 905.
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valued by historians, scientists, religious leaders, and philosophers,3 while being
all but ignored by legal scholars and the courts. Under current law, only the
autobiographical speech that a court is likely to deem "newsworthy" 3 3 is
protected, so that the life stories of the famous and powerful are safe from
censorship while disclosure of the life stories of most "ordinary" 34 people remains
vulnerable to legal challenge .35 For decades these differing levels of protection
for those with "newsworthy" lives and those with "ordinary" lives has raised few
concerns. The development of this distinction corresponded with the rise of the
mass media, which focused (understandably) on broadly newsworthy stories. The
courts were generally content with this arrangement, and in effect deferred to the
media to make gatekeeping choices about newsworthiness. 36But time brings
change. New widespread internet access, combined with the proliferation of
weblogs and social networking sites, has led more people to tell their stories to a
broad audience.3
At the same time, shifting attitudes about privacy have
revealed the desire of many to tell their stories openly.38 Without proper
recognition of the value of autobiographical speech, there is a risk that willing and
truthful speakers will be silenced and that their stories will be lost.
To illustrate how one person's autobiographical speech might be censored
while another's is protected under the current law, it is helpful to compare the
stories of two women-Susanna Kaysen and Jessica Cutler. Susanna Kaysen is
a well-known memoirist, who has won numerous awards for her writing. One
of her books, Girl Interrupted,9 concerning the time she spent in a mental
institution as a teenager, was a bestseller and gave rise to a major motion
32. Id at 914-16, 937-39, 939-43, 934-36.
33. Throughout this Article, I use the term "newsworthy" to describe any speech that a
court has concluded is newsworthy, a matter of public concern, or a matter in the public interest.
34. This Article places the term "ordinary" in quotations, because the term is used only to
suggest the extent that society or the courts might view the speakers' lives as not newsworthy.
35. See Shulman v. Group W Productions, Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 478 (Cal. 1998)
(explaining that the newsworthy exception shields from liability those who publish intimate
details about the lives of public figures).
36. See Amy Gajda, Judging Journalism: The Turn Toward Privacy and Judicial

Regulation of the Press, 97 CAL. L. REy. 1039, 1041 (2009) ("For most of the past half-century,
courts have resolved the tension between privacy and press freedoms by deferring to journalists
in determining news worthiness.").
37. The needs of the ever-expanding media have led to similar results. See Solove, supra
note 9, at 969 ("Today, the ease of disseminating personal information is unprecedented. The
media has grown hungrier for stories, which are needed to fill the vast array of news shows, the
growing number of twenty-four hour cable news networks, and the tens of thousands of
magazines, newspapers, and websites.").
38. West, supra note 12, at 9 19-22.

39.

SUSANNA KAYsEN, GiRL, INTERRUPTED

(Vintage Books 1994).
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picture.4 In 2001, Kaysen published another memoir titled The Camera My
Mother Gave Me,'4 1 in which she discussed her multi-year battle with severe
vaginal pain.4 Among other things, she chronicled the impact that condition
had on her intimate relationship with her then live-in boyfiend. Kaysen
portrayed her boyfriend as insensitive to her ordeal and impatient about her
refusals to have sex.43 The storyline culminates in a scene in which Kaysen
questions whether he might have tried to rape her, although she ultimately
concludes that she consented to the intercourse."4
Following publication of the book, Kaysen's now-former boyfriend sued
her for violating his privacy.4
There was no dispute about the truth of
Kaysen's speech; rather, the question before the court was whether Kaysen had
violated her ex-boyfiend's rights by revealing intimate details about their
relationship.46 The court ruled in favor of Kaysen, deeming her discussion of
how her medical condition affected their relationship a matter of "legitimate
public concern" and therefore constitutionally protected.4
Kaysen's case can be compared to that of another woman-Jessica Cutler.
Cutler was a 24-year-old Capitol Hill staffer when she decided to start a weblog
about her life.4 In that blog, she wrote about the daily events of her life, her

40. See Bonome v. Kaysen, No. 032767,2004 WL 119473 1, at *2 (Mass. Super. Mar. 3,
2004) ("[Susanna Kaysen] gained success and notoriety for her book Girl, Interruptedwhich
was made into what has been described to be a critically acclaimed film.").
41. SusAu*JA KAYSEN, THE CAMERA My MOTHER GAVE ME (200 1).
42. Id.
43. Idatl114.
44. Id. at 125.
45. See Bonome, at *I (describing the details of the invasion of privacy action). While
Kaysen refers to him as only "my boyfriend," and his occupation and hometown were changed,
he argued that he was easily identified by anyone who knew of his relationship with Kaysen. Id.
at *2.
46. See id. at *2 ("Whether the book's publication could construe a violation of
[Bonome's right against unreasonable or serious interference with his privacy] is a question of
law for this court.").
47. See id. at *7 ("Nonetheless, Kaysen's own personal story-insofar as it relates to
matters of legitimate public concern-is hers to contribute to the public discourse. This right is
protected by the First Amendment.").
48. See Poor Mojo's Almanac(k) presents: The Story of the Washingtonienne,
http://poormnojo.org/pmjadaily/washingtonienne.htmn (republishing the Washingtonienne blog
which was removed) (last visited Nov. 5, 2009) [hereinafter The Story of the Washingtonienne]
("I have a 'glamour job' on the Hill. That is, I could not care less about gov or politics, but
working for a Senator looks good on my resume. And these marble hallways are such great
places for meeting boys and showing off my outfits.") (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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friends, and her job .49 But she also wrote about her ongoing sexual exploits
with up to six different men .50 One man was married, one had a high-ranking
government job, another was her superior at work, and at least one, she alleged,
paid her for sex.5' Like Kaysen, Cutler was sued by a former sexual partner for
invasion of privacy. 52 Again there was no dispute about the truth of her speech;
instead, the question was whether she had the right publicly to reveal intimate
information about her relationship with the plaintiff.53 The case against Cutler
survived a series of preliminary motions and proceeded to discovery before the
parties settled the case. 4 Yet Cutler, far more so than Kaysen, faced the risk
that she could be legally penalized for truthfully speaking about her life.
The comparison between the cases against Kaysen and Cutler is striking.
Both women wrote about their sexual relationships and about dimensions of
those relationships that concerned power, tradeoffs, and intimate choices. Both
women spoke willingly and truthfully. The difference between the two, of
course, was that Kaysen was an award-winning author and her speech was
published in a book by Random House. Cutler, on the other hand, was a young
and unknown woman who published her speech through a personal weblog.
Kaysen's life experiences were deemed to be newsworthy and thus protected. 5
Cutler's story, however, was not likely to be found newsworthy and she thus
faced punishment for telling it.
Each woman' s wish to speak truthfully about her life deserves
constitutional protection. Autobiographical speech occupies an exceptional
place in the public discourse-a space rivaled perhaps only by political and
49. Id
50. Id Cutler wrote under a pseudonym and identified the men by their initials only.
After only a matter of weeks, however, she and the men were identified by another blogger. See
April Witt, Blog Interrupted, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 2004, (Magazine), at 12 (describing how
Cutler wrote on her blog for only a couple of weeks before another blogger, known as
'Wonkette,' discovered it and published a link to it on her blog).
51. The Story of the Washingtonienne, supra note 48, at (Tuesday, May 11, 2004, 2:21
P.M.).
52. See Complaint at 1, Steinbuch v. Cutler, No. 1-05-cv-00970 (D.D.C. May 16, 2005)
("Cutler's outrageous actions, setting before anyone in the world with access to the Internet
intimate and private facts regarding Plaintiff, constituted a gross invasion of his privacy,
subjecting him to humiliation and anguish beyond that which any reasonable person should be
expected to bear. . .. ")
53. See id at 2-21 (neglecting to challenge the accuracy of the comments Cutler made on
her blog).
54. Id
55. See Bonome v. Kaysen, No. 032767,2004 WL 119473 1, at *6 (Mass. Super. Mar. 3,
2004) ('These broader topics are all matters of legitimate public concern .... Thus, the
defendants had a legitimate and protected interest to publish these facts.").
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religious speech-in its ability to foster both the autonomy-based and societyadvancing values that justify strong constitutional protection of free speech.5
As to personal autonomy, the value of autobiographical speech is unmistakable.
The basic point is hard to miss: By openly and truthfully discussing our life
experiences, we are free to reexamine our pasts and develop our minds.
Indeed, the work of psychologists and therapists is rooted in the benefits of
autobiographical speech."5
And religious customs have reflected the
importance of such speech for centuries.5
Autobiographical speech also fuilfills the society-based theories of free
speech by promoting a national dialogue in which a rich array of voices share
personal stories to which others can react in ways that reshape their own
attitudes and actions. Protecting the free flow of first-person accounts thus
informs our citizenry, promotes effective democracy, and leads to greater
tolerance. 59
Under current law, truthful autobiographical speech is at risk of being
undervalued and underprotected. Preoccupation with the value of political
speech and exemptions from tort liability only if privacy-threatening speech is
deemed to be "newsworthy" too greatly restricts the range of permissible
autobiographical speech. Of particular concern, failure to protect such speech
risks allowing the voices of the poor, the powerless, and the oppressed to be
erased from our public debate. It is, therefore, imperative to give robust First
Amendment protection to truthfuil autobiographical speech.
B. Information Privacy is Worthy of Protection
On the other side of this conflict lies information privacy, 60 a right of such
popular appeal that even its critics admit it is "easy to endorse. "6'1 Dean Prosser
observed of the tort of public disclosure of private facts that "no other tort has
56. West, supra note 12, at 934-57.
57. Idat937-39.
58. For a more in-depth discussion of the individual-based values of autobiographical
speech, see id. at 934-43.
59. For a more in-depth discussion of the society-based values of autobiographical
speech, see id at 943-57.
60. See Volokh, supra note 20, at 1050-51 (characterizing the right to communication of
personally identifiable information about oneself).
61. Id. at 1050; see also Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24, at 196 ("The intensity and
complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization, have rendered necessary some retreat
from the world, and man, under the refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive to
publicity, so that solitude and privacy have become more essential to the individual.").
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received such an outpouring of comment in advocacy of its existence,"'6 2 and
Harry Kalven warned that "[ilt takes a special form of foolhardiness to raise
one's voice against the right of privacy at this particular moment in its
history.",63 To be sure, the rights of tell-all bloggers like Jessica Cutler have few
apologists,64 and the idea of regulating their speech is attractive to many. Even
Eugene Volokh, who has written critically of information privacy rights,6
confessed:
Speech restrictions aimed at protecting individual privacy just don't get my
blood boiling. Maybe they should, but they don't. Perhaps this is because,
from a selfish perspective, I'd like the ability to stop others from talking
stopping me from talking about
about me, and while I wouldn't like their
66
them, the trade-off might be worth it.
The legal debate supporting the right to protect our privacy from the

"selfish, exploitative, or malicious",67 people in our lives who might share our
secrets is relatively young,68 but the passion and persistence of the scholarly
arguments signal that there is an important interest at stake6 9-one that deserves
consideration. Warren and Brandeis articulated the value of privacy of personal
WtLLLAm L. PROssER, HoRNBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 1051 (1st ed. 1941).
Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren andBrandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 326, 327 (1966).
64. See, e.g., Daniel L. Solove, A Tale of Two Bloggers: Free Speech and Privacy in the
Blogosphere, 84 WASH. U. L. REv. 1195, 1198 (2006) ("Bloggers like Jessica should not have
an unfettered free speech right to disclose intimate details about people's private lives that are
not of legitimate concern to the public."); see also Andrew J. McClurg, Kiss and Tell:
ProtectingIntimate RelationshipPrivacyThrough Implied Contracts of Confidentiality, 74 U.
ONl. L. REv. 887, 938 (2006) ("There is a world (literally) of difference between oral gossip and
Internet gossip. Mass dissemination of private information acquired during an intimate
relationship is an indecent and irresponsible breach of trust-and contract.").
65. See Volokh, supra note 20. at 1090 ("[Slurely it is not for government agentswhether judges or jurors-to dictate the relevant criteria for people's political choices, and to
use the coercive force of law to keep other from informing them of things that they may consider
relevant to those choices.").
66. Id. atl1051.
67. McClurg, supra note 64, at 887.
68. See Solveig Singleton, Privacy Versus the FirstAmendment: A SkepticalApproach,
11IFoRDHAm INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 97, 98 (2000) (explaining that "[p]rivacy as
conceived in twentieth century case law is a young legal concept, less developed than the law of
free speech"); Solove, supra note 9, at 1030 (admitting that information privacy "has not
simmered for centuries like much of tort law or criminal law").
69. See Solove, supra note 9, at 974 ("In a world of unprecedented information
dissemination, with a staggering array of types of media and a profound number of media
entities, the issue of why the law should protect against the disclosure of personal information is
of paramount importance.").
62.

63.
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information in the "most influential law review article of all,""0 writing: "Ofthe
desirability-indeed of the necessity-of some such protection [of the right of
privacy], there can, it is believed, be no doubt."01 Justice White, writing for the
Supreme Court in Cox BroadcastingCorp. v. Cohn,72 an information privacy
case, declared that "powerful arguments can be made, and have been made, that
however it may be ultimately defined, there is a zone of privacy surrounding
every individual."7 3 He added that "the century has experienced a strong tide
4
running in favor of the so-called right of privacy."7
Privacy advocates have made a convincing case that protecting a right of
information privacy serves many of the same goals as free speech, such as
furthering individual autonomy and public debate.7
It has been argued
frequently, for example, that privacy-like free speech and often in connection
with free speech 7 6 -furthers the individual interest in autonomy and selfrealization.7 Privacy advocates do not dispute the important role that freedom
of speech plays in the development of individual autonomy, but they argue that
providing a zone of personal privacy is equally important.7 Accepting that
privacy, in addition to speech, promotes individual autonomy, Daniel Solove
contends that "[tlhere is no clear reason why the autonomy of speakers or
listeners should prevail over that of the harmed individuals. 7
70.
71.
72.
victim's
record).
73.

Kalven, supra note 63, at 327.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24, at 196.
See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494-95 (1975) (finding that a rape
interest in privacy fades when the information involved appears as part of the public

Id. at 487.
Id. at 488.
See infra notes 76-79 and accompanying text (discussing the similar goals served by
protecting the rights of information privacy and free speech).
76. See Sean M. Scott, The Hidden FirstAmendment Values of Privacy, 71 WASH. L.
REv. 683, 723 (1996) (contending that privacy and free speech "both serve the same interest in
individual autonomy").
77. See Randall P. Bezanson, TheRight to PrivacyRevisited: Privacy, News, and Social
Change, 1890-1990, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1133, 1134-35 (1992) (contending that the right to
privacy "at its core" is about giving individuals "a space free from the demands of the larger
social order in which to develop beliefs, attitudes, and behavioral norms"); Paul Gerwitz,
Privacyand Speech, 2001 Sup. CT. REv. 139, 165 (2001) (arguing that "people are more likely
to express themselves fully' openly, and robustly when they have confidence that what they say
will be heard only by a known group of listeners").
78. See Scott, supra note 76, at 723 (arguing that "both [speech and privacy] are critical to
autonomy, it is desirable to give proper weight to both"); Solove, supra note 9, at 992 (stating
that "it is difficult to say whether free speech or privacy promotes more autonomy; both further
autonomy, just in different ways and in different aspects of life").
79. Solove, supra note 9, at 992.

74.
75.
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Scholars also have argued that privacy protection, much like free speech,
furthers the goal of effective democratic self-governance by facilitating
uninhibited public debate. 80 Edward Bloustein, for example, argues that a lack
of privacy of thought leads to conformity of ideas . 8 ' He explains that without
personal privacy:
[A]n individual merges with the mass. His opinions, being public, tend
never to be different; his aspirations, being known, tend always to be
conventionally accepted ones; his feelings, being openly exhibited, tend to
of unique personal warmth and to become the feelings of
lose their quality
82

every man.

Building on this thought, Sean Scott surmises that "[flf granting people
privacy ...encourages this participation in public debate, then privacy
8
promotes the First Amendment value of truth.", 1
There are other reasons why dispensing with privacy protection might
hurt, not help, the political process. Some scholars point to the deterrent effect
on those considering a run for political office.84 Robert Bellah has argued that
80. See id. at 993-94 (noting that "[pirivacy encourages uninhibited speech [and] ....
[i]mportant discourse, especially communication essential for democratic participation, often
takes place in microlevel contexts (between two people or in small groups) rather than in
macrolevel contexts (public rallies or nationwide television broadcasts)"); see also James Nehf,
Recognizing the Societal Value in Information Privacy, 78 WASH. L. REv. 1, 69 (2003)
(explaining that privacy "is a public value because it is necessary to the proper functioning of
our political system").
81. See Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to
Dean Prosser,39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 1003 (1964) (arguing that the law of privacy attempts to
preserve individuality).
82. Id; see also Scott, supra note 76, at 717 (arguing that "studies indicate that the threat
of continued exposure to adverse public opinion curtails an individual's willingness not only to
voice dissenting or nonconformist opinions but also curtails the willingness to entertain such
positions privately") citing S.E. Asch, Effects of Group Pressure Upon the Modification and
Distortion of Judgments, in GROUPS, LEADERSHIP AND MEN 177, 181 (Harold Guetzkow ed.,
195 1))); Knud S. Larsen, The Asch Conformity Experiment: Replication and Transhistorical
Comparisons,5 J. Soc. BEHAv. & PERSONALITY 163, 163 (1990) (verifying the Asch conformity
paradigm-the principle that individuals tend to conform when under pressure of a unanimous
majority); Serge Moscovici, Social Influence and Conformity, in 2 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 347, 347-52 (Gardner Lindzey & Elliot Aronson eds., 1985) (tracing evolution of
social conformity research); Nigel Nicholson et al., Conformity in the Asch Situation: A
Comparison Between ContemporaryBritish and U.S. University Students, 24 BRITISH J. SOC.
PSYCHOL. 59, 59 (1985) (finding that although the effects have weakened over time, there still
remains an observable minority of university students who will conform to group pressure in an
Asch situation).
83. Scott, supra note 76, at 711.
84. See Gerwitz, supra note 77, at 183 ("[I]t is widely believed that many talented people
are being deterred from running for office or assuming senior political appointments because of
a concern about the extreme loss of privacy."); Scott, supra note 76, at 710 n. 171 (speculating
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"the treatment of public figures by the media [might] have a 'chilling effect' on
the decision of individuals to enter the public sphere because they fear what the
85
relentless scrutiny may do to them."
For all of these reasons, I agree with Richard Murphy that "the benefits to
privacy should not be lightly dismissed," but rather "need to be taken into
6
account when trumpeting unrestricted disclosure of personal information."0
And I join Harry Kalven, Jr. in embracing the premise that "privacy is surely
87
deeply linked to individual dignity and the needs of human existence. "
C. Is There Room for Both Interests?
1. Polar Opposites or MirrorImages?
Once we establish that both autobiographical speech and information
privacy are significantly valuable interests that cannot be easily dismissed, the
conflict between the two becomes obvious. Both rights" are valuable and
function to further many of the same goals of individual autonomy and public
debate .89 They are also, however, difficult to reconcile in large part because
they are in essence the same interest. Both the autobiographical speaker and
the privacy plaintiff9" wish to control whether, when, and how personal
information about them is revealed publicly. The Georgia Supreme Court was
that intense public scrutiny has a deterrent "chilling effect" on potential public servants (citing
Robert N.Bellah, The Meaning of Reputation in American Society, 74 CAL. L. Rnv. 743, 746
(1986))).
85. Bellah, supra note 84, at 746; see also Richard Davis, Supreme Court Nominations
and the News Media, 57 ALn. L. REv. 1061, 1078-79 (1994) (examining how increased media
scrutiny has altered the judicial nomination process).
86. Richard S. Murphy, PropertyRights in PersonalInformation: An EconomicDefense
of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2383 (1996).
87. Kalven, supra note 63, at 326.
88. There is some debate over whether the right of information privacy should be treated
as a constitutional right. Compare Rodney A. Smolla, Information as Contraband: The First
Amendment and Liability for Trafficking in Speech, 96 Nw. U. L. REV. 1099, 1150 (2002)
(discussing the case of Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001) and arguing that in "the
premise that the conflict posed between speech and privacy is a conflict between two rights of
constitutional stature. By this important measure, all nine Justices in Bartnicki were in
agreement"), with Volokh, supra note 20, at 1107 ("The fact that the proposed statutory or
common-law right [in information privacy] is in one way analogous to a constitutional right
does not give it constitutional stature.").
89. Supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
90. Throughout this Article, I use the term "privacy plaintiff' to refer to any individual
who might have a claim that private personal information about him was unlawfully disclosed.
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early to recognize this symbiotic relationship between the two, observing that
"the right to withdraw from the public gaze at such times as a person may see
fit," and "the right of one to exhibit oneself to the public" are in actuality flip
sides of the same personal liberty coin.9'
From the beginning, the right of privacy as envisioned by Warren and
Brandeis did not simply entail the "right to be let alone,"02 or, for that matter,
the right of an individual to keep personal facts from public view. Rather,
Warren and Brandeis spoke of securing "to each individual the right of
determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions
shall be communicated to others." 93 An early, well-known privacy case
reflected the same approach, stating that "[o]ne who desires to live a life of
partial seclusion has a right to choose the times, places, and manner in which
4
and at which he will submit himself to the public gaze."0
The modem right of "information privacy "9 has maintained this focus on
the individual's ability to control if, when, and how personal facts are
revealed.9 The U.S. Supreme Court, for example, has stated that "both the
common law and the literal understandings of privacy encompass the
individual's control of information concerning his or her person.",97 Paul
Gerwitz has noted that "[p]rivacy is ultimately about our power to choose our
audience."9 8 Sean Scott has observed that the disclosure of private information
"violates the individual's right to choose who shall be privy to such
information." 9 9 And others have described information privacy as "the right of
decision over one's private personality;"' 0 individuals' "general right to control
the use of information about themselves;"10 1 the "legal power to control the
91. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 70 (Ga. 1905).
92. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24, at 195. While Warren and Brandeis frequently are
credited for coining this famous phrase, they borrowed it from Judge Thomas M. Cooley.
Christina E. Wells, Privacy and Funeral Protests, 87 N.C. L. REv. 151, 174 n. 124 (citing
THomAs M. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888)).
93. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24, at 198.
94. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 70.
95. Throughout this Article, I adopt the term "information privacy" as shorthand to refer
to an individual's interest in not having facts that he considers to be private revealed to anyone
without his consent.
96. See infra notes 97-103 and accompanying text (explaining that the right of
information privacy focuses on an individual's ability to control personal facts about herself).
97. U.S. Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763

(1989).
98.
99.
100.

101.

Gerwitz, supra note 77, at 155.
Scott, supra note 76, at 722.
ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 324 (1967).
Singleton, supra note 68, at 122.
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flow of information about one's self to other people;" 0 2 and "our ability to
03
control who has access to us, and who knows what about us. "'
All of these formulations suggest that it is the control over the disclosure
of information, and not only the maintenance of its secrecy, that lies at the heart
of the legal protection for information privacy. 104 Clearly if the information
were totally secret, there would be no potential privacy invasion because no one
else would have access to it.' 05 Thus, the question is not simply who should
have access to personal information, but, more precisely, who else. And who
gets to decide if, when, and with whom it is shared.
This inescapable bond between the right to choose privacy and the right to
choose publicity of one's personal life is of key importance to the complexity of
the autobiographical speech versus information privacy debate. Both the
privacy plaintiff and the autobiographical speaker seek the right to control the
release of information about themselves. The autobiographical speaker desires
to share his story and has chosen his time, method, and audience. The privacy
plaintiff, meanwhile, wishes to wait until a different time, or to select another
venue, or to limit the number or type of listeners, or to remain quiet altogether.
From each party's perspective, the question focuses on control over personal
information. Thus, simply accepting that control over one's personal
information is a valuable right does nothing to help resolve the conflict whenbecause of shared lives and experiences-more than one person wishes to
control the same piece of information. Is the conflict between autobiographical
speech and information privacy, therefore, a zero-sum game-must one person
always lose and another always win?

102. Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and
Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 291, 293 (1983).
103.
104.

James Rachels, Why Privacyis Important, 4 PHIL. & PUn. AFF., 323, 329 (1975).
See RJcHARD A. PosNER, TH4E ECONOMICS OF JusUCE 271 (1983) ("[W]hen people

today decry lack of privacy, what they want .. , is mainly something quite different from
seclusion: [T] hey want more power to conceal information about themselves that others might
use to their disadvantage.").
105. See U.S. Dept. of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749,
763 (1989) ("In an organized society, there are few facts that are not at one time or another
divulged to another."); Kenneth L. Karst, "The Files":' Legal Controls over the Accuracy and
Accessibility of Stored PersonalData, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROnS. 342, 343-44 (1966)
("Hardly anyone in our society can keep altogether secret very many facts about himself ...
Meaningfuil discussion of privacy, therefore, requires the recognition that ordinarily we deal not
with an interest in total nondisclosure but with an interest in selective disclosure."); Warren &
Brandeis, supra note 24, at 198 (acknowledging that a man may choose to share his personal
thoughts with select others, yet "he generally retains the power to fix the limits of the publicity
which shall be given them").
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2. Must Speech Always Win?
One possible solution to the clash between autobiographical speech and
information privacy is to award the privacy plaintiff total control over his
personal information.1'6 This approach, however, entails denying the
autobiographical speaker the anonymity to share her story. Eugene Volokh
"reluctantly" has concluded that such an approach has "troubling
implications"10 7 by giving the privacy plaintiff too much power-a power he
defined as the "right to have the government stop you from speaking about
me."'10 8 And Tom Gerety has cautioned against an overly broad right of
information privacy, observing that privacy for some theorists "includes all
09
control over all information about one's self, one's group, one's institutions"'
and that "[s]urely privacy should come, in law as in life, to much less than
this."' 10
While privacy advocates do not argue for an absolute right of information
privacy, some scholars have embraced the opposite conclusion-when speech
clashes with information privacy, the speech always wins. At its core, these
commentators argue, this question pits a vague, undefined and untested interest
in privacy against the venerable constitutional right to speak."' For them, to
state the issue this way is in effect to resolve it: The revered speech interest
necessarily must trump the nebulous privacy cam'12
Critics of privacy regulations argue that allowing such an ill-defined
interest to interfere with the long-recognized and celebrated First Amendment
right to speak is constitutionally unacceptable. The most common criticisms of
106. Volokh, supra note 20, at 1050-51.
107. See id. at 1053 (opposing information privacy speech restrictions because of the
troubling nature of their possible unintended consequences).
108. Id at 1050-51; see also Singleton, supra note 68, at 124-25 (describing the right to
control information about oneself as allowing the plaintiff "a right to control a thought in
someone else's mind, even when that thought may later become an observation in a notebook, a
comment to a coworker, or an email to a company"); Zimmerman, supra note 102, at 293
(noting the problems with awarding anyone "the right to govern authoritatively both the nature
of personal information exposed to public view and the conditions under which others may
discuss those personal facts").
109. Tom Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 233, 262-63 (1977).
110. 1dat263.
111. See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Musings on a Famous Law Review Article: The

Shadow of Substance, 41

CASE W. REs. L. REv.

823, 828 (199 1) ("It is difficult to argue, as a

constitutional matter, that protection against publication of ill-defined 'private' facts, causing
entirely intangible harms, should outweigh for example a defendant's [constitutional] right to
publish material acquired through personal observation or other fair means.").
112. Id
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information privacy regulations are that the interest they seek to safeguard is
too new and undefined to deserve such strong protection.' 13 Particularly
troublesome to critics is the lack of consensus on a definition of "privacy," a
difficulty that increases the risk of self-censorship. For example, Diane
Zimmerman has argued that the right of privacy is "rich in symbolic value but
has little particularized meaning." 14 Even defenders of privacy law admit that
there is no real agreement about what core values are at stake," 5 and their
"[a]ttempts to define the concept of 'privacy' have generally not met with any
success." 116 William Beaney has commented that "even the most strenuous
advocate of a right to privacy must confess that there are serious problems of
defining the essence and scope of this right.""17 Spiros Simitis has noted that
"the more the need for a convincing definition of privacy based on criteria free
of inconsistencies has been stressed, the more abstract the language has
grown."" 8 And Daniel Solove has acknowledged that it is "a concept in
disarray" because "[n]obody can articulate what it means."' 19
Thus, the right of privacy has been described as "exasperatingly vague and
evanescent,"120 "highly malleable,"'12 '1 and "infected with pernicious
ambiguities."' 22 Robert Post confessed: "Privacy is a value so complex, so
entangled in competing and contradictory dimensions, so engorged with various
and distinct meanings, that I sometimes despair whether it can be usefully
addressed at all."' 23 Judith Jarvis Thomson summed up the problem with

113. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (discussing the brief history of the right of
information privacy).
114. Zimmerman, supra note 111, at 826.
115. See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus
Liberty, 113 YALE L. J. 1151, 1153 (2004) ("[Hjonest advocates of privacy protections are
forced to admit that the concept of privacy is embarrassingly difficult to define ... . [M]any of
them feel obliged to concede that privacy, fundamentally important though it may be, is an
unusually slippery concept.").
116. COLIN J. BENNETT, REGULATING PRIVACY: DATA PROTECTION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN
EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 25 (1992).
117. William A. Beaney, The Right to Privacy andAmerican Law, 31 LAW & CoNTEMP.
Paoas. 253, 255 (1966).
118. Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacyin an InformationSociety, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 707,
708 (1987).
119. DANIEL J. SOLO YE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY]1 (2008).
120. ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, AND
DOSSIERS 25 (1971).
121. JOHN T. SOMA & STEPHEN D. RYNERsoN, PRIVACY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 7 (2008).
122. Hyman Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L. REv. 34, 35 (1967).
123. Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2087 (2001).
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defining privacy by declaring that "nobody seems to have any very clear idea

what it is."

124

The lack of consensus on what, exactly, privacy law seeks to protect raises
alarms for free speech scholars. Uncertainty about what is and is not allowed
inevitably leads to a chilling effect.125 Volokh has argued that relevant
standards are "so vague . .. that accepting them may jeopardize a good deal of
speech that ought to be protected," 126 and Zimmerman has warned that a
constitutional privacy regulation "would have to be defined precisely and
clearly enough that a publisher would have fair warning of the approximate
27
location of the line between protected and unprotected revelations." '
These commentators argue that the constitutional interest at stake with
28
truthful speech is simply too strong to allow these types of restrictions.1
Diane Zimmerman, for example, has contended that the tort of public
disclosure of private facts is unconstitutional and incompatible with our free
speech jurisprudence. 129 According to Zimmerman, the right of privacy as
developed by Warren and Brandeis "has actually had a pernicious influence on
modern tort law because it created a cause of action that, however formulated,
cannot coexist with constitutional protections for freedom of speech and

press."130

124. Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Right to Privacy, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF
PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 272, 272 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984).
125. See, e.g., ROBERT M. O'NEIL, DIEFIRSTAMENDMENT AND CIVL LIABIITY 167 (2001)
(noting that, from a free speech standpoint, the decision to settle a lawsuit concerning true
private facts "may ... set a much more om-inous precedent, than would losing the case in
court"); BRUCE W. SANFORD, DON'T SHOOT ThE MESSENGER: How OUR GROWING HATRED OF
THE MEDIA THREATENS FREE SPEECH FOR ALL OF Us

8 (1999) ("Judges, dismayed by the media's

newsgathering practices, are cutting back on constitutional protections for the press .... The
U.S. Supreme Court maintains a stony silence.").
126. Volokh, supra note 20, at 1116.
127. Zimmerman, supra note 102, at 342.
128. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Shielding Children, and Transcending
Balancing, 1997 Sup. CT. Ruv. 141.,195 (1997) ("Speech must often be protected even though
protecting it unavoidably causes substantial costs to compelling government interests-even
though there are no less restrictive but pretty much equally effective alternatives to speech
suppression." (citations omnitted)). But see Matthew J. Coleman, The "Ultimate Question": A
LimitedArgumentfor Trafficking in Stolen Speech, 55 OKLA. L. REV. 559,560-61 (2002) ("The
Supreme Court has wisely declined 'to answer categorically whether truthful publication may
ever be punished consistent with the First Amendment. . . ."' (citations omitted)).
129. See Zimmerman, supra note 102, at 294 ("[Hlarmonizing privacy with free speech has
attracted many outstanding scholars of tort and constitutional law. .... [A]ttempt[ing] tojustify'
the tort, however, they have often underplayed its serious constitutional problems and have
overlooked the fact that genuine social values are served by encouraging a free exchange of
personal information.").
130. Id. at 292.
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The "speech always wins" approach is further supported by the argument
that there are certain types of intimate human relationships that are simply illsuited for legal rules.' 3 ' As Zimmerman has explained, "we refuse to resolve
some human problems by law because we are unwilling to bear the cost that
legal solutions would impose."132 Because of the complexities of human
interaction, Zimmerman concluded that the answer lies with "social evolution"
rather than "an enunciation of new legal restraints."'
This argument contends that the law should not silence a truthful speaker,
but instead it should place the burden on the privacy plaintiff to exercise care
when deciding to whom he reveals personal information.' 3 4 The Supreme
Court has, to some degree, adopted this approach to privacy by stating that
"[e]xposure of the self to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a
civilized conmmunity."135 Zimmerman agrees, noting that "[p]erhaps the best
defense against the effects of public gossip is a willingness to be more discreet
in revealing personal information about ourselves and in exposing our intimate
36
behavior to public view."'1

There is an appealing simplicity to this "caveat emptor" 37
1 style approach
to privacy and speech. If a person does not want his personal information
revealed publicly, then he should take greater care in choosing the people to
whom he reveals that information. Susanna Kaysen's boyfriend, for example,
presumably knew that his long-time girlfriend wrote memoirs for a living.' Is
131. See id at 364 ("If the balance [between privacy and free speech] has really tipped too
far and redress is needed, it may be better to rely on the same processes of social evolution that
initially created our excessive taste for personal details, rather than to leap into the breach with
an enunciation of new legal restraints." (citations omnitted)).
132. Id at 365.
133. Id at 364.
134. See id. at 364 n.382 ("'Some recent writers on privacy have lamented that selfinvasion is growing dangerously in American sociey.... What will happen to respect for
privacy, it is asked, when people blurt out their views ... T" (citations omitted)).
135. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967).
136. Zimmerman, supra note 102, at 364.
137. See, e.g., Zhulei Tang et al., GainingTrust Through Online PrivacyProtection: SelfRegulation, Mandatory, or Caveat Emptor, 24 J. MGMT. INFO. SYS. 153, 155-56 (2008) ('The
first category is caveat emptor-literally,'let the buyer beware.' Under this approach, retailers
are under no obligation to post a privacy notice or to obey fair information practices. However,
if they post privacy policies, they are required by law to abide by them.'); see also Mark F.
Kightlinger, The Gathering Twilight? Information Privacy on the Internet in the PostEnlightenment Era, 24 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 353, 368 (2007) ("If, consistent
with his or her own values, an individual decides to provide [information] to a Web site that
makes no representations about whether and how it will protect the [information], then the
individual must live with the consequences of his or her decision. The rule is caveat emptor.").
138. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text (describing Susanna Kaysen's career as
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it not proper to consider him on notice that some personal aspects of their lives
might end up in the public domain? In similar fashion, why should Jessica
Cutler's paramours,' 3 9 specifically if they had only episodic contact with her,
rest in her a faith to keep quiet about sexual and other aspects of their
relationships? And the "assumption of risk" argument becomes even stronger if
we view the acts the plaintiffs wish to conceal as involving possible
wrongdoing such as violent behavior, illegal activity, or immoral acts like
40

infidelity.1

It is not uncommon in tort law to examine the plaintiff s behavior before
determining whether or not he is eligible for recovery from the defendant.'14' In
defamation law, for example, the courts consider whether the plaintiff has
thrust herself into the public arena before determining the burden for
recovery.14 2 Warren and Brandeis took a similar approach in their initial view
of the privacy right.'143 They stated that a person who was active in "public life"
would have less of a privacy right about the disclosure of information that had
bearing on their fitness for a public role, even if the information in question was

about their private life.'"4
The difficulty with this approach is that it goes too far. It is unrealistic to
expect every person to bear the responsibility of not revealing to anyone
a memoir author).
139. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text (discussing the controversy
surrounding Jessica Cutler and her blog).
140. See Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REv. 393, 399 (1978) ("We
think it wrong (and inefficient) that the law should permit a seller in hawking his wares to make
false or incomplete representations as to their quality. But people 'sell' themselves as well as
their goods."); see also Zimmerman, supra note 102, at 327 ("[We... tacitly recognize that the
cohesiveness and durability of any social organization depends upon the ability of its members
to evaluate each other accurately and to use their observations to exert, modify', or develop
social controls." (citations omnitted)).
141. See Jason M. Solomon, Judging Plaintiffs, 60 VAND. L. REv. 1749, 1767 (2007) ("In
the common-law privacy tort of public disclosure of private facts, a plaintiff's efforts to keep
certain facts private are assessed in determining liability.").
142. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,344 (1974) (noting that "public figures
usually .. , have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private
individuals" and that individuals who "seek govemnmental office must accept..,. the risk of
closer public scrutiny").
143. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24, at 213 (describing "the right of one who has
remained a private individual, to prevent his public portraiture" as the "simplest case" for
extension of the right of privacy (emphasis added)).
144. See id. ("Peculiarities of manner and person, which in the ordinary individual should
be free from comment, may acquire a public importance, if found in a candidate for political
office."). The authors go on to explain that "[slome further discrimination is necessary,
therefore, than to class facts or deeds as public or private according to a standard to be applied
to the fact or deed per se." Id.
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information that they do not wish revealed to everyone. The interest in
information privacy is not necessarily about protecting complete solitude but
rather, as Randall Bezanson explained, it is about a "space of intimate
associations."' 4 5 Privacy, Bezanson argued, is "a space occupied by others,
46
but only by some others."'1

Zimmerman's approach is not only unduly dismissive of the intimacy
that does and should exist in human relationships, it also fails to deal with
14
many potential scenarios that give rise to information-privacy problems. 1
Of particular importance, many privacy plaintiffs will have had little or no
choice in their shared experiences with a future speaker.148 They might have
crossed paths because of the accident of birth, the necessity of work, or a
random act of fate. For these privacy plaintiffs, it is not helpful to speak
about exercising care in choosing with whom one enters into intimate
relationships. As Judge Posner explained when discussing the Supreme
Court's decision in FloridaStar v. B.JF.,4 which involved a newspaper's
publication of the identity of a rape victim, "[t]o be identified in the
newspaper as a rape victim is intensely embarrassing. And it is not invited
50
embarrassment. No one asks to be raped."'
A final point going against the "speech always wins" approach is that the
U.S. Supreme Court has never, despite repeated opportunities, ruled out the
possibility that a privacy interest could prevail over a speech right. In
FloridaStar v. B.J.F., for example, the Court emphasized that it was not
holding "that truthful publication is automatically constitutionally protected, or
that there is no zone of personal privacy within which the State may protect the
individual from intrusion by the press." 151 Similarly, the Court in Cox
145. Randall P. Bezanson, The Right to Privacy Revisited Privacy, News, and Social
Change, 1890-1990, 80 CAL. L. REv. 1133, 1135 (1992).
146. Id.
147. See Zimmerman, supra note 102, at 364 (describing much modem information
disclosure as "reflexive[]" and advocating a guarded approach to personal information sharing).
148. See Peter B. Edelman, Free Pressv. Privacy: Hauntedby the Ghost ofJusticeBlack,
68 TEx. L. REv. 1195, 1207 (1990) ("If the lawfulness of the acquisition. ...
is the standard for
disclosure of private facts .. . the Court's peculiar definition of the lawfully obtained criterion
will deny the privacy that plaintiffs claim in virtually any case imaginable."). Edelman
specifically describes the situation of B.J.F.: "Regardless of the strength of a state's policy
against disclosure, a moderately diligent reporter can find a source who will share the name of a
rape victim or a juvenile suspect." Id.
149. See Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532 (1989) (holding that because ofthe First
Amendment, a newspaper could not be held liable for damages for reporting the name of a rape
victim).
150. Haynes v. Knopf, 8 F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th Cir. 1993).
151. FloridaStar, 491 U.S. at 541.
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Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn'512 refuised to answer "the broader question
whether truthful publications may ever be subjected to civil or criminal liability
consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments."'15
Although any bright-line approach has its appeal, the conflict between
speech and information privacy cannot convincingly be resolved through a rule
that always favors speech. The privacy interest at stake is too valuable to
dismiss quite so easily.
III. Privacy v. Speech: The Searchfor a Workable Framework
In Part 11, I suggest that it is overly simplistic to take an absolutist
approach to the problem posed by autobiographical speech and information
privacy by concluding that either the speech right or the privacy right always
must prevail.154 The question then becomes how to balance the two
diametrically opposed interests. Is there a framework that protects the
important speech right of the autobiographical speaker while still giving
appropriate deference to an individual's interest in privacy of personal
information? One thing is certain: Any potential resolution will not be simple.
The rejection of an absolutist viewpoint necessarily means adopting a more
55
complicated approach.1

A number of commentators have attempted to push the speech-versusprivacy conflict into preexisting legal frameworks-most commonly either
152. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975) (citing prior precedent to
explain the decision not to "address .. . whether the State may ever define and protect an area of
privacy free from unwanted publicity in the press").
153. Id at 491; see also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 518 (2001) (describing the
case about the disclosure of an intercepted telephone conversation as "a conflict between
interests of the highest order," including freedom to share information and individual privacy);
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (referring to the right of privacy as "'a
basic of our constitutional system"' (citations omitted)).
154. See supra Part II (discussing the dichotomous approaches of other scholars to the
problem of free speech versus privacy).
155. See Edelman, supra note 148, at 1229 ("When speech is truthful, balancing its value
against the privacy rights of an individual is assuredly a complex task."). It also means that
courts must engage in some kind of balancing of the two interests. See Solove, supra note 9, at
1031 ("[N]ot all speech is of equal value, nor is speech a value superior to all others. It is
imperative to balance. Balancing means assessing the value of particular forms of speech
against their costs."). But see Julie E. Cohen, ExaminedLives: InformationalPrivacy and the
Subject as Object, 52 STAN~. L. REV. 1373. 1412 (2000) ("The US. West [v. FCC] decision
nicely illustrates Peter Edelman's observation that judges balancing speech and privacy claims
reveal themselves to be 'absolutists, in balancers' clothing. "' (quoting Edelman, supranote 148,
at 1223)).
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property or contract law.'156 These approaches, however, suffer from many
flaws. They do not adequately take into account the dual interests at stake and
raise the risks of underprotection. ' And, even if workable in other contexts,
these frameworks are ill-suited for dealing with the special problem posed by
autobiographical speech.
A. Property

One of the most popular approaches among commentators is to argue that
individuals maintain a property interest in their own life stories or personal
information. Warren and Brandeis began by fr-aming their concept of information
58
privacy as one that arises out of "[tlhe right of property in its widest sense,"1
although they ultimately abandoned the property analogy and declared privacy to
be a distinct right.' 59 Other privacy scholars, however, have not given up so
easily. For example, Alan Westin stated that personal information "should be
defined as a property right, with all the restraints on interference by public or
private authorities and due-process guarantees that our law of property has been
60
so skillful in devising."
156.

See, e.g., Vera Bergelson, It's Personalbut Is It Mine? TowardProperlyRights in

PersonalInformation, 37 U.C.

DAVIS L. REv.

379, 384 ("[Tlhe property regime is the most

appropriate regime for regulating rights in personal infomation. .. ."); Patricia Mell, Seeking
Shade in a Land of PerpetualSunlight: Privacyas Properly in the Electronic Wilderness, I1I
BERKELEY TECH. L.J.

1, 26 (1996) ('While not always apparent the balance [between public self

and private identity] was traditionally sought in the recognition of varying property rights in the
resource of the persona. "); Smolla,supra note 88, at 1164 (finding a correlation between privacy
law and property law in the Supreme Court's "specific[] analogizing [of] the state-created
privacy-property right and federal intellectual property law, and noting that protection of the
privacy-property right ... actually worked to foster and enhance First Amendment values'
(citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562,563-64 (1977))); Volokh,supra
note 20, at 1122 ("[R]estrictions on speech that reveals personal information are constitutional
under current doctrine only if they are imposed by contract.").
157. See Candice L. Kline, Security TheaterandDatabase-DrivenInformation Markets: A
Casefor an Omnibus DataPrivacy Statute, 39 U. TOL. L. REv. 443,464 (2008) ("[C]ontract law
are not the only substantive law sources that fail to adequately protect individual privacy
interests. Under both substantive property law and fourth amendment jurisprudence, the theory
of personal data as property also achieves limited success in affirming an individual's right to
data privacy.").
158. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24, at 211.
159. See id. at 213 (concluding that privacy rights are "rights as against the world");
Dorothy Glancy, Privacy and the Other Miss M, 10 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 401, 417 (1990) ("In
discussing [the property] aspect of the original concept of the right to privacy, Warren and
Bradeis ... argued that these intangible property rights should be seen as part of a larger
category of legal right, the right to privacy. ... 0)

160.

WESTIN,

supra note 100, at 324-25; see also Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture Of
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Looking at information privacy as a type of property right suggests that each
61
individual has an ownership interest in his or her life story and personal facts.1
Viewing personal information this way is attractive to privacy advocates because
it opens up a constitutional end-run around the First Amendment. The
recognition of intellectual property rights, whether in copyright or trademark, has
given rise to broad exceptions to the free speech rights of individuals. 162 Thus,
once private information is defined as a property right, the "circulation of personal
information by someone other than the owner is handling a dangerous commodity
in interstate commerce."' 63 As Julie Cohen has argued, once we accept that
personal information "is the property or quasi-property of the individual to whom
it refers, then ...speech rights cannot be absolute, and may not prevail at al"6
The problem with applying the property rubric to information privacy is that
it is not a good fit with cur-rent law.'165 Viewing the right of information privacy
through the lens of copyright, trademark, or patent,166 for example, is not helpfu~l
because these are far narrower rights than a right to own your life experiences.
Mere facts are not copyrightable as a form of original expression;16 7 trademarks
only guard against consumer confusion;168 and patent law protects inventions
69
implementing new technical ideas.'1
Privacy, 1 VAND.

J. ENT. L. &PR-Ac. 56, 63-64 (1999) (arguing in favor of applying a property

regime to private information).
161. See, e.g., Bergelson, supra note 156, at 383 ("[Iln order to protect privacy, individuals
must secure control over their personal information by becoming its real owners.").
162. See Volokh, supra note 20, at 1051 ("[A]n intellectual property rights rationale is
already being used as an argument for other speech restrictions .. .

163.

WESTIN,

supra note 100, at 325.

164. Cohen, supra note 155, at 1420.
165. See Smolla, supra note 88, at 1164 (acknowledging that intellectual property is not
"some kind of anti-First Amendment talismn... guaranteed to keep the free speech doctor
away," and suggesting an understanding of the First Amendment negating "an absolute bar
against information contraband"); Volokh, supra note 20, at 1051 ("Such arguments [that
information privacy laws protect intellectual property rights] don't fit well into the intellectual
property exceptions to the First Amendment, which generally don't entitle anyone to restrict the
communication of facts.").
166. The law of trade secrets is more likely to have some relevancy to the speech versus
privacy debate. This area, however, is discussed infra, Part III.B, because of its similarities to
contract law.
167. See Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340,344 (1991) ("That there
can be no valid copyright in facts is universally understood.").
168. See Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN DIEcio L. REv. 721, 744 (2004)
("Legal protections for trademarks are doctrinally justified by the need to prevent consumer
confu~sion, which potentially disadvantages both individuals who are tricked by confusing or
deceptive trademarks .. , and the providers of goods and services who lose sales when
consumers are confused or deceived.").
169. See Singleton, supranote 68. at 126 ("Patent law .. , creates a property right in ideas,
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While some scholars support applying the property framework to
information privacy, 170 the courts for the most part have rejected this
approach.'17 ' In Melvin v. Reid,172 for example, one of the first and most famous
information privacy cases, the Supreme Court of California rejected the idea
that a former prostitute had a property right in her personal life story.'7 The
court said it could find "no authorities sustaining such a property right in the
story of one's life"'174 and that right of privacy "is an incident of the person and

not of property.0

75

The courts are reluctant to embrace a property view of information
privacy, according to Singleton, because the concept of privacy is so complex
and because property interests seldom give rise to damages "for purely
emotional injuries" such as those at issue in public disclosure cases. 17
Intellectual property rights, moreover, have been given explicit constitutional
approval, found in Congress's express powers of Article 1, Section VIIn, 7 but
"property rights in privacy do not have constitutional sanction."' 78 Margaret
Radin has explained that "in the language of the First Amendment, 'expression'
is something that is not propertized and indeed is something whose value
79
requires it not to be propertized." 1
The property framework, moreover, is not helpful in resolving the conflict
between information privacy and autobiographical speech. Even if we accept
that individuals have an intellectual property ownership interest in their life
but only in certain new ideas within a narrow technical sphere.").
170. See, e.g., Lessig, supra note 160, at 63 ("A better solution, I suggest, is one that links
the protection of architecture with the incentives of the market. Information is an asset ...the
market could negotiate these rights."); Murphy, supra note 86, at 2383 ("[P]rivacy protection for
information conveyed incident to a contractual relationship has increased both in the common
law and in statutory law.").
171. See Singleton, supranote 68, at 112 ("The tort of public disclosure of embarrassing
public facts comes closest, in theory, to embracing a broad view of property rights in personal
privacy. But in practice, skeptical courts have curtailed it.").
172. See Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 94 (Cal. Ct. App. 193 1) (holding that no authority
exists for a property right in one's life story).
173. Id
174. Id
175. Id at 92-93.
176. Singleton, supra note 68, at 114.
177. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 (describing Congress's power to "secur[e] for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries").
178. Singleton, supra note 68, at 133.
179. Margaret Jane Radin, Regime Change in IntellectualProperty: Superseding the Law
of the State with the "Law" of the Firm, I U. OTrAWA L. & TECH. J. 173, 176 (2003).
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stories, this acknowledgement fails to answer questions raised when one person
exercises a right to disclose or not disclose a shared life experience. The
property framework does not suggest how to resolve the tie between shared
owners of the same personal information. Treating the privacy plaintiff and the
autobiographical speaker as co-owners of the property might strongly favor the
speaker, for example, because copyright law allows one co-owner to use the
copyrighted material however she wishes without the permission of the other. 180
Intellectual property law also recognizes a public need for access to certain
expressions and all facts and ideas, which is evident in the doctrine of fair
use,' 81 the idea/expression dichotomy,182 the merger doctrine,' 8 3 and the time
84
limitations on ownership.1

Publicity law is another area which, in theory, might fit with information
privacy and autobiographical speech because, as discussed above, they all

8
involve control over if, when, and how personal information is made public.1 1

Yet again, however, the law in this area is a poor match with the privacy and
speech interests at stake.
Publicity law focuses on the commercial exploitation of a person's name,
likeness, and persona that most commonly arises in cases involving
celebrities.18 6 The issue is the right to control the pecuniary interest in one's
identity.187 Thus, while the right of publicity (or appropriation) is one of
180. See Erickson v. Trinity Theatre, Inc., 13 F.3d 1061, 1067-68 (7th Cir. 1994)
(explaining that in a joint work, a joint author has the right to use or license the work, subject
only to an obligation to account to the other for any profits).
18 1. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) ('[Tlhe fair use of acopyrighted work including such use
by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for
purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for
classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.").
182. See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 104 (1879) ("[W]hilst no one has a right to print or
publish his book, or any material part thereof, as a book intended to convey instruction in the
art, any person may practise [(sic)] and use the art itself which he has described and illustrated
therein.").
183. See id. ("The copyright of a book on book-keeping cannot secure the exclusive right
to make, sell, and use account-books prepared upon the plan set forth in such book.").
184. See 17 U.S.C. § 302 ("Copyright in a work created on or after January 1, 1978,
subsists from its creation and, except as provided by the following subsections, endures for a
term consisting of the life of the author and 70 years after the author's death.").
185. See supra Part II.C (discussing attempts to form a rule that reconciles the conflict
between information privacy and autobiographical speech).
186. See, e.g., CAL. CIVIL CODE § 3344(a) (2006) ("Any person who knowingly uses
another's name, voice, signature, photograph, or likeness .. . shall be liable for any damages
sustained by the person or persons injured as a result thereof.").
187. See RicHARn A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 3.3, at 43 (4th ed. 1992)
(explaining that the publicity right is protected because "whatever information value a
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Prosser's four privacy rights,188 it is generally treated like a property right in
one's personality.'189 Because the right of publicity is about protecting the
commercial value of one's identity, courts have concluded that it "does not
include a person's life story"'19 0 or "general incidents from a person's life."'19'
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals further explained:
The narrative of an individual's life, standing alone, lacks the value of a
name or likeness that the misappropriation tort protects. Unlike the
goodwill associated with one's name or likeness, the facts of an individual's
life possess no intrinsic value that will deteriorate with repeated use.' 92
In an autobiographical speech context, it is the individual life experiences that
are usually of value, not the commercial value of the plaintiff's identity. The
autobiographical speaker is trying to share his life story and not seeking to
193
profit from the plaintiff's celebrity.
Recognizing a property right in our own life experiences is appealing
because of a shared sense that these personal stories are something we own. In
practice, however, privacy and property are a poor fit. Intellectual property law
has developed around a concept of personal ownership in expression, not facts,
and is designed primarily to compensate the plaintiff for revenues that were lost
due to the unauthorized acts of others. Both autobiographical speech and
information privacy, on the other hand, involve intensely personal interests that,

celebrity's endorsement has to consumers will be lost if every advertiser can use the celebrity's
name and picture").
188. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 401 (1960) ("[T]his form of
invasion has bulked rather large in the law of privacy. It consists of the appropriation, for the
defendant's benefit or advantage, of the plaintiffs name or likeness.').
189. See Phillips v. Scalf, 778 N.E.2d 480,483 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) ("The alleged chattel
in this case is Scalt's right of publicity associated with Dillinger. Ind. Code § 32-36-1-7 creates
a 'property' right in a personality's right of publicity.").
190. Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 437 (5th Cir. 1994).
19 1. Id. at43 8.
192. Id; see also Groden v. Random House, Inc., 61 F.3d 1045, 1050 (2d Cir. 1995)
(explaining that speakers are free to use another person's identity as long as the use was only
"incidental" to a matter of public interest); see Sarah M. Konsky, Publicity Dilution: A

ProposalforProtectingPublicityRights, 21

SANTrA CLARA ComPUTER & HIGH TECH.

L.J. 347,

371 (2005) ("[P]rivacy law is intended to deal with use of a person's name or likeness that
causes emotional harms or offends the expectation of solitude-the very injuries suffered by
nonfamous people.").
193. If the speaker's goal were to profit financially, the speech would likely not be purely
auoigraphia asdfndifra in Part IV.B. 1. If, however, a case arose where a true
autobiographical speaker was nonetheless profiting off of the identity of the plaintiff, then some
compensatory damages for right of publicity might be appropriate.

THE STORY OF US61

619

if violated, yield emotional harms. Thus, property does not appear to be the
appropriate framework for this conflict.
B. Implied Contract or Duty of Confidentiality
A much more promising avenue for balancing the interests of information
privacy versus the freedom of speech is to analyze the situation as an implied
contract or a duty of confidentiality. The theory here is that individuals in
certain relationships could be seen as having an implied contract with each
other that neither will reveal publicly certain private information about the
other.'194 Closely related to the implied contract approach is the theory that
some people who possess personal information about others have an
95
enforceable duty of confidentiality preventing them from disclosing it.'
Securing an express promise not to disclose private information is clearly
one way for a privacy plaintiff to get around the free speech protections of the
First Amendment because the Supreme Court has stated that a person may
bargain away their constitutional rights to speak.'196 It is also generally accepted
that certain relationships embody an implied promise of confidentiality. 9
These relationships include an individual's dealings with her doctor, her
banker, her clergy member, or her lawyer.'198 As Volokh has explained,
"[w]hen these professionals say 'I'll be your advisor,' they are implicitly
promising that they'll be confidential advisors, at least so long as they do not
explicitly disclaim any such implicit promise." 199

194. See, e.g., McClurg, supra note 64, at 888 (proposing that in intimate relationships,
there is an implied contract that the parties will not disseminate private, embarrassing
information about the other that was acquired during the relationship).
195. See, e.g., Bezanson, supra note 77, at 1135 (suggesting that there is an enforceable
duty of confidentiality that is based on the individual's control of the information rather than
social controls on it); Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/InformationProperty, 52 STAN. L.
REv. 1283, 1308 (2000) (suggesting that disclosure of personal information should be
actionable as a "breach of trust").
196. See Cohen v. Cowles, 501 U.S. 663, 670 (199 1) ("There can be little doubt that the
generally applicable to the daily transactions
Minnesota doctrine of promissory estoppel is. ...
of all the citizens of Minnesota. The First Amendment does not forbid its application to the
press."').
197. See Volokh, supra note 20, at 1058 ("In many contexts, people reasonably expectbecause of custom, course of dealing with the other party, or all the other factors that are
relevant to finding an implied contract-that part of what their contracting partner is promising
is confidentiality.").
198. See id (discussing confidentiality in doctor-patient and lawyer-client relationships).
199. Id.
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To say that one set of relationships gives rise to a duty of confidentiality,
however, is a far cry from saying that other, very different relationships entail
the same obligation. What is more, even if a duty of confidentiality exists, the
question arises of how far it extends. Nonetheless, Andrew McClurg has
argued the law should presume that "an implied contract of confidentiality
arises in intimate relationships that the parties will not disseminate through an
instrument of mass communication private, embarrassing information
(including photos or videotapes) about the other acquired during the

relationship."000
Similarly, Neil Richards and Daniel Solove have argued that the courts
should read a duty of confidentiality into intimate relationships to resolve these
disputes .20 1 They point to the British breach of confidentiality tort-which they
argue has the same common law origins as American privacy law-as a
model. 0 Under English law, a duty of confidentiality attaches "whenever
20 3
information is imparted, either explicitly or implicitly, for a limited purpose.
This system allows recovery by a plaintiff against a number of people if they
reveal information of a personal nature because "'[t]he information about the
relationship is for the relationship and not for a wider purpose. 004 English
law, Richards and Solove argue, "serves as a useful example of an alternative
way that the common law can conceptualize and regulate unwarranted
disclosures of personal information."2 05 Thus, this view suggests that, based on
societal norms, most individuals have an implied duty not to reveal certain
private information about others with whom they have a personal
relationship. 0
Even critics of the public disclosure tort or other information privacy
protections, such as Zimmerman and Volokh, have suggested that expanded
200. McClurg, supra note 64, at 888.
201. See Neil M. Richards & Daniel J.Solove, Privacy'sOther Path: Recovering the Law
of Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123, 157 (2007) ("A plaintiff can prove ...the existence and
breach of a duty of confidentiality. Courts have found the existence of such a duty by looking to
the nature of the relationship between the parties, by reference to the law of fiduciaries, or by
finding an implied contract of confidentiality.").
202. See id. at 158 ("English law, like American law, also developed a law of 'private'
information. As in America, this English strand of the common law also traces its origins back
to PrinceAlbert v. Strange.").
203. Id at 159.
204. Id. (quoting Barrymore v. News Group Newspapers, Ltd., (1997) F.S.R. 600 (Ch.)
(U.K.)).
205. Idatl181.
206. See id. ("Unlike the American tort, which thus far has been limited to particular
relationships, the English tort has a much more open-ended applicability based on the
expectations of the parties in any given relationship.").
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contract liability might be an appropriate method for addressing problems
posed by the unauthorized disclosure of private information. 0 Volokh has
conceded that at least to some limited degree, applying contract law to promises
not to reveal personal information "is eminently defensible under existing free

speech doctrine.

20 8

While the implied-contract framework is a promising approach to some
speech-versus-privacy problems, it is insufficient to resolve the conflict with
autobiographical speech. For this approach to work it would need to hinge
significantly on the contextual intricacies of the relationship, making it difficult
to predict whether a duty exists and leading to a highly subjective analysis.
This subjectivity is inherently threatening to the constitutional rights of the
autobiographical speaker. 0
As an initial matter, the origin of this duty of confidentiality is
questionable. Do we really have such societal customs against disclosure?
Does a reasonable person assume a sibling or child will not someday, through
the telling of her life story, reveal private information about the family? Is it
reasonable for someone entering into a relationship, even an intimate
relationship, to presume the other person will not reveal private matters that
occurred? The concept of "kissing and telling" is nothing new 2 '0 and neither is
autobiography. 2 1' And while the concept that a person has a right to control
what information about himself or herself is released publicly is found in areas
such as the doctor-patient relationship or the attorney-client privilege, "[t]he
individual's right to control information is far from implicit in other human

207. See Volokh, supra note 20, at 1057 (agreeing with the Court in Cohen v. Cowles
Media, 501 U.S. 663 (1990), that it is proper to allow people to contract away their right to
speak, and that a disclosure of private information under such circumstances should give rise to
breach of contract); Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24, at 211 (concluding that the doctrines of
breach of confidence and implied contract "could not afford all the protection required");
Zimmerman, supra note 102, at 363 (observing that more attention should be given "to
increasing the use of legal sanctions for the violation of special confidential relationships, in
order to give individuals greater control over the dissemination of personal information").
208. Id.
209. See infra note 224 and accompanying text (discussing the possibility that a contextual
approach to the speech-versus-privacy conflict with respect to autobiographical speakers risks
creating a chilling effect on speech and encouraging self-censorship).
210. According to William Safire, "[tihe original meaning of the infinitive phrase to kiss
and tell was 'to boast of one's sexual exploits.' It was coined, or first used in print, by the
playwright William Congreve in his 1695 comedy, 'Love for Love': '0 fie, Miss,' said a swain
worried about his love's indiscretion (she was in the process of blabbing all to her stepmother),
'you must not kiss and tell."' William Safire, On Language: Kissing and Telling aboutKissand-Tell, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1988, Sunday, Late City Final Edition § 6, at 16.
211. West, supranote 12, at 914-15.
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relationships.4 12 As Singleton has observed, "[g]enerally, people do not feel
obligated to ask for anyone's permission before relaying the information they
have collected to a third party, however embarrassing the subject of the
information might be." 213 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals suggested that
society accepts that when we allow another into our home, that person "may
repeat all he hears and observes when he leaves. 2 14 In keeping with this
thinking, most states and the federal government have enacted "one-person
consent" laws that allow a conversation to be recorded as long as one person in
the conversation is aware of the recording. 2 15 Thus, rather than embracing a
web of implied contracts or duties not to disclose, both legal and societal
customs suggest the contray-that we accept that we are free to talk about
others and they are free to talk about us. As one court has noted, "[a] cause of
action can not lie each time someone succumbs to the temptation to break a
2 16
confidence and whisper a juicy rumor.
Discerning the parameters of a duty of confidentiality in personal
relationships is also problematic. How many dates are required before the duty
kicks in? Does a one-night stand qualify? Assuming a marriage creates the
duty, does a divorce nullify it? How can a person desiring to share his or her
story (and therefore reveal parts of others' lives) cancel an implied promise not
to tell or refuse to make it? Must a potential future speaker declare her
intentions at the outset of the relationship? Must the other person consent?
Clearly an adult member of a family who wishes to speak about his childhood,
including revealing personal information about other family members, cannot
be forced into silence because he did not negate the implied duty at birth or as a
young child.
A realistic and workable contract or confidentiality framework, therefore,
would need to embrace a highly contextual approach to these relationships and
employ a fact-based inquiry into the particular relationship at issue. Thus, in
some intimate relationships there might be facts suggesting an implied promise
existed while in others there are not. Each relationship is different and
212. Singleton, supra note 68, at 123.
2 13. Id.
214. Dietemana v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245,249 (9th Cu. 1971l); see also Sin gleton,supra
note 68, at 124-25 (arguing that it is "a default rule of human interactions, and not something to
which we consent" that all individuals may share opinions and observations about others).
215. See The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Can We Tape? A Practical
Guide to Taping Phone Callsand In-PersonConversations in the 50 States andD.C., available
at http://www.rcfp,.org/taping/quick~htm] (revealing that only twelve states require the consent
of all parties to tape telephone calls).
216. Blair v. Union Free Scb. Dist. No. 6, Hauppauge, 324 N.Y.S.2d 222,228 (N.Y. Dist.
Ct. 1971).
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therefore broad norms are insufficient to set the rule. Sometimes ten dates
would be enough to invoke the duty, but sometimes less and sometimes more.
What we are looking for, in other words, would be an implied-in-fact contract
not one that was implied-in-law. 1
This implied-in-fact contract analysis is similar in many ways to trade
secret law, which requires a case-by-case factual inquiry into issues such as
whether the information at issue was actually secret; 218 whether the owner of
the secret took adequate protective measures; 2 19 and whether the defendant
knew that the information was a trade secret. 2 Only in "extreme cases,'
according to Judge Posner, can a trade secret dispute be settled on summary
judgment because there are so many factual considerations that must be
examined by a trial court judge or a jury.2 2 Ultimately, the question in trade
secrets cases is whether the defendant disclosed information that he "knew or
had reason to know" was a trade secret.2 2 In other words, was there an implied
understanding between the two parties that the defendant would not disclose
2 23
the information?
The difficulty with applying such a highly contextual approach to the
speech-versus-privacy conflict is the lack of predictability and fairness and,
most significantly, the highly subjective nature of such an inquiry. Clearly,
217. See 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 6 ("A contract implied in fact is one not expressed by the
parties, but implied from facts and circumstances showing a mutual intention to conract ....
Contracts implied in law ... are distinguishable in that such contracts do not rest on assent of
the parties, but may exist regardless of assent.").

218.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR

COMPETITON

§ 39 (1995) ("A trade secret is any

information that can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is
sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over
others.'); see also Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24, at 212 (discussing the problems with
viewing privacy through a trade secrets framework).
219. See id. § 40 ('One is [liable] for the appropriation of another's trade secret if... the
actor knows or has reason to know that the information is a trade secret .. , unless the
acquisition was the result of the other's failure to take reasonable precautions to maintain the
secrecy of the information.").
220. See id ("One is subject to liability frteapoitonof
another's trade secret if...
the actor acquires by means that are improper under the rule stated in § 43 information that the
actor knows or has reason to know is the other's trade secret. .. .)
221. See, e.g., Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 179 (7th
Cir. 199 1) (observing that determining whether reasonable precautions were taken "depends on
a balancing of costs and benefits that will vary from case to case and so require estimation and
measurement by persons knowledgeable in the particular field of endeavor involved").

222.
223.
the actor
acquired
other. ..

RESTATEMENT (THI1RD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 40(b)(1).
See id ("One is subject to liability for the appropriation of another's trade secret if...

knows or has reason to know that the information is a trade secret that the actor
under circumstances creating a duty of confidence owed by the actor to the
.)
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replacing broad rules with case-by-case inquiries comes at the cost of
predictability for the parties. An autobiographical speaker would have a
difficult time discerning in advance whether the particular relationship she
wishes to discuss involved an implied-in-fact contract or duty of confidentiality.
The number and types of factors found in human relationships that could be
relevant to this analysis are overwhelming and unclear. As is always the case
whenever there is uncertainty with speech regulations, this would raise
concerns of a chilling effect where valuable speech is wrongly silenced .224 That
concern of self-censorship is especially high here. The implied-rn-fact contract
approach, moreover, is also highly subjective for many of the same reasons it is
unpredictable. 2 With so many factors to consider and so little guidance on
how to evaluate them, the judge or jury would have too much power to protect
the speech of some based on subjective opinions about the speaker and not
based on the law.
Applying this framework to intimate human relationships, furthermore, is
less fair than in the trade secret context. With trade secrets, the inquiry is into
whether the defendant genuinely knew or had reason to know that the

information at issue was a secret that he was obligated not to reveal. 226

It is

appropriate to apply this standard to the arms-length relationships between
employers and employees or among business competitors. Participants in these
relationships are more likely to be on notice that their interactions are triggering
legal duties and that those duties might include obligations not to disclose. 2
In the context of personal relationships, however, it is far less likely that the
parties knew they were invoking a legal obligation to keep a secret. Applying
such a duty to them would require embracing a legal fiction that goes against
224. See Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n, 484 U.S. 383, 393 (1988) ("[T~he alleged
danger of th[e] statute is, in large measure, one of self-censorship; a harm that can be realized
even without an actual prosecution."); Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967)
("The danger of that chilling effect upon the exercise of vital First Amendment rights must be
guarded against by sensitive tools ..... )
225. See, e.g., Rachel Leiser Levy, JudicialInterpretationof Employee Handbooks: The
Creationof a Common Law Informnation-ElicitingPenaltyDefaultRule, 72 U. CMI. L. REV. 695,
719 (2005) (discussing employee handbooks as implied-in-fact contracts and finding it troubling
that "increased judicial application of common law exceptions to employment at will has caused
the law surrounding employment termination to become increasingly confused and
unpredictable").
226. See supra notes 218-23 (discussing the legal standard for determining when a trade
secret has been appropriated, which is based on an actual or implied understanding between the
two parties).
227. MELviN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS § 4.1 (2010) (noting that a number of states follow
a quasi-theory of trade secrets in which there is an "implied obligation of an employee to protect
trade secrets of an employer").
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our societal norms and fails to give the parties adequate notice of their potential
liability.
Ultimately, autobiographical speech made by the "ordinary" person would
be particularly vulnerable under the contract or confidentiality approach.
Individuals who desire to speak publicly about their life experiences will most
assuredly be speaking about others as well. If they are bound by an implicit
promise not to disclose information about the people with whom they have
developed a relationship, their stories simply cannot and will not be told. One
might respond that this limiting duty will extend only to other persons with
whom the would-be speaker has developed an intimate relationship. Yet the
closer a relationship is, the more central it becomes to the speaker's story. The
consequences of muzzling autobiographical speakers are grave because
silencing autobiographical speech prevents people from giving witness to their
life experiences. The result is that their stories are erased from the public
dialogue.
IV Proposinga New Approach to the Face-Off
The foregoing analysis suggests that previous efforts to deal with speechversus-privacy conflicts involved trying to shove a square peg into a round
hole. The power to disclose, or not to disclose, personal information should not
be transmuted into something it is not-whether that something is a property
right, an implied contract, or a duty of confidentiality. In this Part, I return to
the world of tort law in search of a resolution. Through a reexamination of the
tort of public disclosure of private facts, I conclude that its overemphasis of the
"newsworthiness 2 28 of the disclosure is constitutionally fatal for the tort
because it leaves valuable speech unprotected. But by taking a new look at the
2 29
requirement that the disclosure be "highly offensive to a reasonable person,
I argue that both the tort and the privacy interest it seeks to protect can be
saved. I propose a new "justified disclosure" approach that directs the focus
away from the problematic newsworthiniess inquiry. This approach accepts that
the core purpose of the tort is not to separate information based on
newsworthiness but rather to prevent unjustified disclosures.2 3 It is unjustified
228. 1 note again that I use the term "newsworthiness" to refer to a court's inquiry into
whether speech is newsworthy, a matter of public concern, or a matter in the public interest.
229. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
230. See id § 652D cmt. h ("The line is to be drawn when the publicity ceases to be the
giving of information to which the public is entitled, and becomes a ... sensational prying into
private lives for its own sake, with which a reasonable member of the public .. , would say that
he had no concern.").
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disclosures, and not non-newsworthy ones, that are "highly offensive to a

23
reasonable person.", '

Analyzing the tort through the lens of whether the disclosure was justified
or unjustified (as opposed to newsworthy or not newsworthy) is consistent with
one view of the case law, adequately balances the competing interests of speech
and privacy, fits within our cultural norms, and is constitutionally sound. It
protects autobiographical speech while providing some security for information
privacy. It is also arguably more predictable and fair than other suggested
frameworks. And while my analysis focuses on autobiographical speech, its
sliding scale approach promises to be applicable in other broader conflicts
between free speech and privacy.
Admittedly, the justified disclosure approach does mean that the privacy
interest will outweigh the speech right only in a small number of cases where
the autobiographical speech interest is minimal and the privacy interest is
exceedingly high. The Supreme Court's approach to any regulation on the
content of the speech-requiring that the government establish that the
regulation was necessary to further a compelling government interese 3 -IS
purposely difficult to overcome. 3 The result is a system in which proper
protection of the free speech interests necessarily leaves only a narrow path to
victory for privacy plaintiffs. 3 General constitutional protections for speech
combined with the unique value of autobiographical speech suggest that
establishing liability should be difficult, yet the special importance of
information privacy argues that recovery not be entirely foreclosed. 3

23 1. Id
232. See Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987) (explaining
that to defend content-based restrictions on speech, the government "must show that its
regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that
end").
233. See Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 199-200 (1992) ("To survive strict scrutiny.
however, a State must do more than assert a compelling state interest-it must demonstrate that
its law is necessary to serve the asserted interest.... [W]e readily acknowledge that a law rarely
survives such scrutiny. . . .
234. See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Real People in Fiction: Cautionary Words About
Troublesome Old Torts Poured into New Jugs, 51 BROOK. L. REv. 355, 366 (1985) (observing
that "occasions when competing social values are found to outweigh the interest in unrestricted
freedom of speech are highly exceptional").
235. The Court struck a similar speech-favoring balance in the conflict with defamation
and reputational harm by allowing a limited path for recovery in an attempt to safeguard the
community's interest in protecting reputation "while diminishing as little as possible the
constitutionally guaranteed right of free speech." Id. at 367.
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A. Reexamining the Tort of PublicDisclosure of PrivateFacts
1. An Overemphasis on Newsworthiness
The centrality of the newsworthiness defense in cases involving speech
and privacy is difficult to overstate. Warren and Brandeis exempted "matter[s]

which [are] of public or general interest, 236 from their fledgling privacy

right,237

and Dean Prosser built on this idea by defining the tort as including only "not
newsworthy" disclosures. 3 Recognition of the newsworthiness defense by the
courts developed later in keeping with the expanding view of press freedoms
generally. 239 Today, consent and newsworthiness are repeatedly listed as the
primary two defenses to a disclosure charge. 4 In fact, much of the scholarship
on the privacy-versus-speech debate presupposes that the conflict is between
private plaintiffs and the media so that the ultimate question is whether the
speech is newsworthy. 24'
This focus on newsworthiness by courts and scholars has led to an
incorrect assumption by many that a disclosure of a private fact is either
newsworthy and therefore constitutionally protected or not newsworthy and
therefore of lesser or no First Amendment value. 4 The Ninth Circuit has
declared as much, stating that "unless it be privileged as newsworthy ...the
236. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24, at 214.
237. There is an irony in the overemphasis on newsworthiiness today, however, which is
that Warren and Brandeis were concerned with revelations by the press. See Kalven, supranote
63, at 330 ("Warren and Brandeis were concerned only with public disclosure in the press of
truthful but private details about the individual which caused emotional upset to him."). Indeed,
it is now well known that it was the press's coverage of his daughter's wedding which first led
Warren to write the article. Id. at 329 n.22. See generally Amy Gajda, Wh7at if Samuel D.
Warren Hadn 't Married a Senator'sDaughter?: Uncovering the Press Coverage That Led to

"The Right to Privacy," 2008

MICH. ST. L. REv.

35 (arguing that negative press coverage of

Warren's family influenced him to define the right of privacy).

238.

PROSSER,

supra note 62, at 299.

239. See generally Amy Gajda, Judging Journalism: The Turn Toward Privacy and
JudicialRegulation of the Press,97 CAL. L. RB'.. 1039, 1044-61 (2009) (discussing the rise of
the newsworthiness; exception).

240.

See Geoff Dendy, The New4sworthiness Defense to the PublicDisclosure Tort, 85 KY.

L.J. 147, 151 (1997) ("The primary two defenses to the public disclosure tort are consent and
newsworthiness.").
241. See, e.g., Solove, supranote 9, at 1029 ("It is the media's dark underbelly-reorting
on the latest celebrity scandal-that will be in the gray zone and might be chilled. And this
consequence is not as terrible as the free speech critique proponents make it out to be.").
242. See, e.g., Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Fitting Publicity Rights into Intellectual
Propertyand Free Speech Theory: Sam, You Made the Pants Too Long!, 10 DEPAUt-LCA J.
ART & ENTr.L. & POL'Y 283, 295 (2000) (observing this dichotomy in the fair use exception to
right of publicity cases).
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publicizing of private facts is not protected by the First Amendment. 24 3 The
Tenth Circuit has agreed that "dissemination of non-newsworthy private facts is
not protected by the first amendment." 2 "4 Rodney Smolla has interpreted the
Court's decision in Bartnicki v. Vopper245 as holding that the newsworthiness
defense "separate[s] that which deserves protection from that which does
1 propose that this is a false dichotomy and an unconstitutional approach.
While newsworthy speech certainly is deserving of constitutional security, a
finding that speech is not newsworthy should not strip it of all First
Amendment protection. There are important constitutional values in nonnewsworthy speech that deserve attention even when facing off against
information privacy. Nothing in First Amendment law even remotely suggests
that only speech on "newsworthy" subjects merits judicial protection. 4 All
sorts of communicative activity, ranging from the expression of group pride, 4

to musical performance

2 49

to nude dance 250 have been wrapped in the mantel of

Amendment.2 5

the First
My work suggests one additional category has
constitutional value-autobiographical speech-and there certainly may be
more. The key point is that autobiographical speech, even with respect to non243. Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 1975).
244. Gilbert v. Med. Econs. Co., 665 F.2d 305,308 (10th Cir. 1981); see also Shuhuan v.
Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 484 (Cal. 1998) ("The contents of the publication or
broadcast are protected only if they have 'some substantial revelant [sic] to a matter of
legitimate public interest."' (quoting Gilbert, 665 F.2d at 308)).
245. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 535 (2001) ("[A] stranger's illegal conduct
does not suffice to remove the First Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public
concern. The months of negotiations over the proper level of compensation for teachers at the
Wyoming Valley West High School were unquestionably a matter of public concern ...
246. Smolla, supra note 88, at 1152.
247. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515
U.S. 557, 579 (1995) ("The very idea that a noncommercial speech restriction be used to
produce thoughts and statements acceptable to some groups or, indeed, all people, grates on the
First Amendment, for it amounts to nothing less than a proposal to limit speech in the service of
orthodox expression.").
248. See id at 557 ("The [South Boston Allied War Veterans] Council refused a place in
the 1993 event to respondent GLIB, an organization formed for the purpose of marching in the
parade in order to express its members pride in their Irish heritage as openly gay, lesbian, and
bisexual individuals.")
249. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) ("Music, as a form of
expression and communication, is protected under the First Amendment.").
250. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 566 (1991) (holding that nude dance
is "expressive conduct within the outer perimeters of the First Amendment").
251. See id at 573 ("[The] use of the State's power violates the fundamental rule of
protection under the First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of
his own message.").
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newsworthy subjects, advances the individual and societal goals of the freedom
of speech. It, therefore, deserves constitutional protection.
Not only is the law's existing emphasis on newsworthiness; constitutionally
unsound, it generates confusion because it shifts attention away from the actual
type of disclosures of private information that society finds highly offensive and
with which the public disclosure tort is concerned. The tort is not about the
protection of newsworthy speech, but about protecting individuals from
unwarranted and emotionally painful disclosures of private information. In
other words, as courts balance autobiographical speech and information
privacy, it is critical that they keep in mind what the tort is trying to preventextremely harmful disclosures made without an adequate justification.
Newsworthiness is one such adequate justification, but it is not the only one.
Disclosures done for purely voyeuristic reasons, however, are not sufficiently
justified. The appropriate question in a speech-versus-privacy conflict is thus
not whether the speech is newsworthy, and therefore protected, but rather
whether the defendant's reason for disclosing the information was strong
enough to outweigh the emotional harm to the plaintiff.
2. The Dual Purposes of the "Offensiveness" Inquiry

While supporters of the tort argue that individuals should have a right to
control if, when, and how private information is revealed, 5 the tort on its face
does not allow individuals to keep any fact in their lives private at any time. As
Dean Prosser explained, "[tlhe law of privacy is not intended for the protection
253
of any shrinking soul who is abnormally sensitive about such publicity.v
Rather, the tort places several limitations on what kind of personal information
can be protected from disclosure and under what circumstances. For example,
there is no privacy violation if the information revealed was already known by
many people 25 4--even if someone has gone to great lengths to keep it secret
from a certain segment of society or acquaintances-because "there is no
liability for giving further publicity to what the plaintiff himself leaves open to
the public eye. "255 Likewise there is no recovery if the disclosure was not

252. See supra Part ll.C. 1 (discussing how both autobiographical speech and information
privacy protect the individual's ability to control personal information).
253. Id. at 396-97.
254. See, e.g., Sipple v. Chronicle Publ'n Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 1047-48 (1984)
("[Ihere can be no privacy with respect to a matter which is already public.").
255. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D crat. b (1977).
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"public" in the sense that it was revealed to a large audience. 5 And, of course,
the "newsworthiness" exception means that persons might find themselves at
the center of a public controversy concerning even the most private matter, with
no recourse whatsoever. 5 As Judge Posner has explained:
People who do not desire the limelight and do not deliberately choose a
way of life or course of conduct calculated to thrust them into it
nevertheless have no legal right to extinguish it if the experiences that have
befallen them are newsworthy, even if they would prefer that those
258
experiences be kept private.
All of these limitations on recovery embrace an understanding that all
individuals must live with the risk that, at times, they might involuntarily lose
control over personal information. 5
The most significant limitation on recovery is the requirement that the
disclosure must be "highly offensive to a reasonable person." 26 0 Dean Prosser
explained that "[a]ny one who is not a hermit must expect the more or less
casual observation of his neighbors and the passing public as to what he is and
does, and some reporting of his daily activities."2 6 ' A privacy violation, thus,
must involve a revelation of a greater magnitude than this and be something
that a reasonable person would conclude has crossed the line.26
The offensiveness element plays a key role in defining the private-facts
tort, and close inspection reveals that courts view it as serving two different
purposes. The first purpose is to ensure that the sensitive and personal content
of the information revealed is of a nature that a reasonable person would find it
highly offensive. The second function of the offensiveness element is to
examine the purpose of the disclosure and discern whether the reason for the
256. See id. § 652D cmt. a ("[Ilt is not an invasion of the right of privacy ... to
communicate a fact concerning the plaintiff's private life to a single person or even to a small

group of persons.").
257. See Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th Cir. 1993) ("[Tuhe First
Amendment greatly circumscribes the right even of a private figure to obtain damages for the
publication of newsworthy facts about him, even when they are facts of a kind that people want
very much to conceal.').
2 58. Id
259. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 652D cmt. c (1977) ("Complete privacy does
not exist in this world except in a desert, and anyone who is not a hermit must expect and
endure the ordinary incidents of the community life of which he is a part.").
260. Id § 652D.
261.

Prosser, supra note 188, at 396-97.

262.

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF

TORTs § 652D cmt. c ("The rule stated inthis Section

gives protection only against unreasonable publicity, of a kind highly offensive to the ordinary
reasonable man.").
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disclosure was of such minimal social or personal value that it does notjustify
the harm it has caused.
a. The Nature of the Informnation
The first type of "offensiveness" is fairly straightforward. In order to
prevail on a public disclosure claim the plaintiff must show that a reasonable
person would conclude that the content of the information is of a kind that its
disclosure qualifies as highly offensive. 6 Mere embarrassment or humiliation
alone is not considered sufficient to meet this standard .2 64 Rather, the
publicized information must be "deeply shocking to the average person
subjected to such exposure. 265 As a general matter, a reasonable person would
be offended to have nude photos revealed publicly, but not offended to have
revealed a photo of her walking down the public sidewalk. Dean Prosser
pointed out that "[tlhe ordinary reasonable man does not take offense at
mention in a newspaper of the fact that he has returned from a visit, or gone
camping in the woods, or that he has given a party at his house for his

friends., 266

Certain categories of information are frequently found to be highly
offensive under this standard-such as sexual matters and medical
267
information.
Judge Posner declared in one case that protecting "intimate
physical details" is at "[t]he core" of the public disclosure tort.2 6 Yet even in
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D.
264. See id. § 652D cmt. c ("Even minor and moderate annoyance, as for example through
public disclosure of the fact that the plaintiff has clumsily fallen downstairs and broken his
ankle, is not sufficient to give him a cause of action under the rule stated in this Section.").
265. Haynes, 8 F.3d at 1234-35.
266. Prosser, supra note 188, at 396-97; see also Koussevitsky v. Allen, Towne & Heath,
68 N.Y.S.2d 779,782 (N.Y. App. Div. 1947) ("The [right of privacy] statute likewise has been
held not to apply to articles which, though not strictly news, are informative and educational and
which make use of the names or pictures of living persons .... [T]he use must be of such a
nature as would not outrage a common ordinary decency.").
267. See Prosser,supra note 188, at 397 ("It is quite a different matter when the details of
sexual relations are spread before the public gaze, or there is highly personal portrayal of his
intimate private characteristics or conduct." (citations omitted)); see also Banks v. King
Features Syndicate, 30 F. Supp. 352, 353-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (determining the liability for
publishing the x-rays of a woman's pelvic region); Myers v. U.S. Camera Pub. Corp., 167
N.Y.S.2d 771, 773-74 (N.Y. City Ct. 1957) (analyzing the liability of publishing a nude full
body photograph of a model).
268. See Haynes, 8 F.3d at 1234-35 ("Thie core of the branch of privacy law with which we
have been dealing in this case is the protection of those intimate physical details the publicizing
of which would be not merely embarrassing and painful but deeply shocking to the average

263.
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cases that involve disclosure of this type of intimate information, the identity of
the plaintiff and the context of the information could affect the analysis. For
example, it might not be offensive for nude photos to be released of a celebrity
who has made a name for herself as a sex symbol even if it would be highly
offensive for most individuals. 6 Conversely, the release of generally banal
information like addresses and telephone numbers is unlikely to be offensive
for most people but could be highly offensive if it were the personal
information of abortion providers who have been the target of death threats. 7
b. The Reason for the Disclosure
The second function of the "offensiveness" element examines the reason
for the disclosure and then determines whether that reason provides a sufficient
justification for disclosure in the eyes of a reasonable person. Several courts,
for example, have suggested that a reasonable person would not find it highly
offensive for personal information to be publicly disclosed if it were
newsworth y,27 1 surmising that "the public's interest in the news and the absence
of less invasive methods of reporting the story may mitigate the offensiveness
of the intrusion. 2 72 Similarly, the California Supreme Court has held that an
intrusion into a person's privacy might not be highly offensive, or might be less
offensive, "when employed by journalists in pursuit of a socially or politically
important story, 273 than if done purely for the purpose "of harassment,
blackmail or prurient curiosity. "274 The point is that the purpose of the invasion
person subjected to such exposure.").
269. See, e.g., Michaels v. Internet Entmn't Group, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 840 (C.D. Cal.
1998) (discussing whether the contents of a tape disclosure of which reasonable persons would
find objectionable as not objectionable when the person has made herself a sex symbol).
270. See Planned Parenthood v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290F.3d 1058, 1077 (9th Cir.
2002) ("[W]hat our settled threats law says a true threat is: a statement which, in the entire
context and under all the circumstances, a reasonable person would foresee ... as a serious
expression of intent to inflict bodily harm upon that person.").
271. See Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th Cir. 1993) ("[T]he First
Amendment greatly circumscribes the right even of a private figure to obtain damages for the
publication of newsworthy facts about him, even when they are facts of a kind that people want
very much to conceal."). In Bonome v. Kaysen, the court found that it was not "offensive" to
have personal information revealed only to the extent it shared a logical nexus with a matter of
legitimate public concern. Bonome v. Kaysen, No. 032767, 2004 WL 119473 1, at *7 (Mass.
Super. Mar. 3, 2004).
272. Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cos., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1190 (D.
Ariz. 1998).
273. Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 493 (Cal. 1998).
274. Id.
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of privacy is vital to determining whether the act was sufficiently offensive to
trigger liability.
By examining the justifications for disclosure of personal information, the
courts reveal that a disclosure is most likely to be deemed highly offensive-or
unjustified-when it arises out of simple nosiness about other people's lives.27
Warren and Brandeis wrote in favor of a right of privacy to prevent the
publication of "unseemly gossip," arguing that "[w]hen personal gossip attains
the dignity of print, [it] crowds the space available for matters of real interest to
the community. 2 76 Judge Posner described the offense as being about
preventing "gratuitous" disclosures 2 77 explaining that the goal is to prevent "the
publication of intimate personal facts when the community has no interest in
them beyond the voyeuristic thrill of penetrating the wall of privacy that
surrounds a stranger. 278 The Restatement explains that we are most offended
by the "morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake, with
which a reasonable member of the public, with decent standards, would say that
he had no concern. 2 7 9 The Ninth Circuit observed that disclosures that satisfy

nothing more than our "prurient curiosity

280

are not protected while the Sixth

Circuit has decried invasions of privacy that are nothing more than "obvious
exploitation[s] of public curiosity. ,8
It is when an individual suffers substantial emotional harm because his
private information was exposed for the purpose of gawking, prying, or
gossiping that the courts are concluding that the privacy interest can prevail.
Thus, the public disclosure tort, at its core, is aimed at protecting us from
extreme cases of this sort of "gratuitous" speech. 8
Some gossip might
275. See Haynes, 8 F.3d at 1232 ("[AIII the circumstances of an intrusion, including the
motives or justification of the intruder, are pertinent to the offensiveness element.").
276. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24, at 196.
277. Haynes, 8 F.3d at 1229.
278. Id. at 1232.
279. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h (1977). "However, the newsworthy
privilege is not without limitation. Where the publicity is so offensive as to constitute a morbid
and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake, it serves no legitimate public interest
and is not deserving of protection." Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 767
(Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (internal quotations omitted); see also Michaels v. Internet Entm't Group,
Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 840 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652D cmt. h).
280. Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 493 (Cal. 1998).
28 1. Cantrell v. Forest City Publ'g Co., 484 F.2d 150, 156 (6th Cir. 1973), rev'don other
grounds, 419 U.S. 245, 252 (1974).
282. See Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1229 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Publicizing
personal facts that while true and not misleading are so intimate that their disclosure to the
public is deeply embarrassing to the person thus exposed and is perceived as gratuitous by the
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nevertheless be protected because the information revealed is not highly
offensive. And some gossip might be protected because it is found to be
newsworthy. But there is a category of gossip that is highly offensive to us
because its disclosure was unjustified, and this is where the public disclosure
tort bares its teeth. There are commentators who have suggested that gossip (at
least in certain forms) is socially valuable, 8 but the constitutional argument for
regulation of this type of voyeuristic disclosure is far sounder than is the current
system targeting all non-newsworthy speech. The states' interest in protecting
their citizens from these types of disclosures is more compelling, the First
Amendment value of the speech is lower, and the tort is more narrowly drawn.
3. Focusingon the Purpose of the Disclosure Tort
From what has been said so far it appears that the tort, as reflected in the
courts' views of "offensiveness," is concerned with protecting disclosures that
are done for the "right" reasons as well as with stopping disclosures that are
done for the "wrong" ones .2 84 There are a number of "wrong" reasons that raise
few constitutional concerns; blackmail and harassment, for example, have been
mentioned .285 The remaining "wrong" reasons are described in various terms
but tend to converge on the same idea-private individuals should not have to
suffer the severe emotional harm of having a deeply personal fact about them
revealed publicly if the purpose of the disclosure is not sufficient to a
reasonable person. The simple desire of some to pry into the private lives of
others, these cases reveal, is not a sufficient justification. It is this type of
unwarranted disclosure that the community finds "highly offensive" and for
which constitutional protections are at their weakest or perhaps nonexistent.
And despite repeated predictions of its demise, the public disclosure tort
perseveres in order to prevent and punish this type of harmful disclosure.

community.").
283. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 140, at 396 ("Gossip columns open people's eyes to
opportunities and dangers; they are genuinely informational."); see also Zimmerman, supranote
102, at 334 ("Gossip ... appears to be a normal and necessary part of life ... ). But see
Solove, supra note 9, at 1064 ("As for gossip, although some of the time it can educate people
about human nature, often it functions l entertain.... If the purpose of gossip is to teach
us lessons about human nature in general, there is often no need to identify individuals who
desire privacy.").
284. See supra Part IV.A.2.b (discussing the justifications that permit individuals to release
information that otherwise would be offensive).
285. See Shulman, 955 P.2d at 493 (stating that information collecting techniques done for
purposes such as harassment, blackmail or prurient curiosity are generally unprotected reasons).
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This analysis suggests that the common approach to the disclosure tort as
requiring a simple separation of the newsworthy from the non-newsworthy
disclosure is incorrect. Instead, the focus should be on the justification for the
disclosure and whether it is sufficient to overcome the harm to the plaintiff. As
Daniel Solove recently suggested, it is the "context in which it is gathered and
disseminated, and ...the purpose or the use of the data" that should decide

whether the disclosure is protected or not.286 Solove explained that "[a] focus
on uses means that the law must examine the purpose of the disclosure, notjust
the nature of the information disclosed. 2 87 Yet Solove-like most othersplaces emphasis on trying to separate out the speech that involves a matter of
public concern, which he calls "high value" speech, from that of purely private
concern, which he considers "low value" speech. 8 This analysis is in essence
the same as the newsworthiness inquiry. He concludes that "[o]ften, the same
piece of information is of both private concern and public concern-it just
depends on the context. 2 89 Under this approach, personal information that is
revealed for a newspaper article is more likely to be considered high value
speech than is personal information used for commercial marketing. 9
This view of the "high" versus "low" value of speech is particularly
Indeed, the value of
concerning for the autobiographical speaker.
autobiographical speech emanates largely from its immensely personal nature.
Most autobiographical speakers experience the rewards of self-realization and
fulfillment by telling their stories to a broad audience. At the same time, they
add to the public discourse and debate by commenting on life in our society and
on the human condition as lived by the individual in real terms. For this
reason, our individual and collective understanding is enhanced by hearing
their voices. The autobiographical speech concept is aimed at protecting this
type of seemingly non-newsworthy speech by ordinary citizens. Yet there is a
great risk that the value of hearing about life experiences of "ordinary" people,
particularly members of minority and oppressed groups, will not be recognized
by courts or by society. Thus drawing a legal line based on ajudge's or jury's
view of whether their stories are a matter of "public concern" or of "high value"
is exceedingly troubling. 291 The ultimate decision as to what is or is not a
286. Solove, supra note 9, at 975.
287. Idatl10l9.
288. Idat103l1.
289. Solove, supra note 9, at 103 1.
290. See id at 1019 (describing the low value of placing information in other sources of
publication compared to the high value of publishing information in a news source).
29 1. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) (rejecting a
standard that "would allow a jury to impose liability [on speech) on the basis of the jurors'
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significant part of a person's life story should rest with that person alone.
Much like deciding what constitutes great art,29 autobiographical speech is an
area in which "no official, high or petty, 293 should be given the power to decide
the worth of any individual's life story. With Solove, I share the view that

looking at the context of the speech and the use of the information is helpful. 294

disagree, however, that the proper touchstone for analysis concerns whether
the speakers' purpose focuses on sharing newsworthy information versus nonnewsworthy information. The proper approach would take account of both
aspects of the "offensiveness" inquiry-focusing not only on the nature of the
information itself but also the purpose of the disclosure.
I

B. The AutobiographicalSpeech Justi~fication
When private information is disclosed publicly, therefore, the proper
question is not simply whether the information was newsworthy-which is a
constitutionally underinclusive inquiry-but whether there was a sufficient
justification for the disclosure such that a reasonable person would not find its
revelation highly offensive .295 Taking into consideration the individual and
public value of autobiographical speech, I propose that it is not highly offensive
tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular expression').
292. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239,251-52 (1903) (noting
the dangers of allowing judges to assess the value of pictorial illustrations). The Bleistein Court
stated:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of
the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the one extreme, some works of genius
would be sure to miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive
until the public had learned the new language in which their author spoke. It may
be more than doubted, for instance, whether the etchings of Goya or the paintings
of Manet would have been sure of protection when seen for the first time. At the
other end, copyright would be denied to pictures which appealed to a public less
educated than the judge. Yet if they command the interest of any public, they have
a commercial value,-it would be bold to say that they have not an aesthetic and
educational value,-and the taste of any public is not to be treated with contempt.
It is an ultimate fact for the moment, whatever may be our hopes for a change. That
these pictures had their worth and their success is sufficiently shown by the desire
to reproduce them without regard to the plaintiffs' rights.
Id
293. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
294. See Solove, supra note 9, at 1019 ("In addition to examining the relationships in
which information is transferred, privacy law must also account for the uses to which it is put.").
295. See supra Part IV.A2 (discussing the requirements and purpose of the
newsworthiness exception).
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to have personal information revealed when that information is substantially
related to the speaker's autobiographical purpose. In the context of core
autobiographical speech, much like in the context of newsworthiness, the
privacy interest should yield to the speech interest if the speech is truly
autobiographical and if the information is substantially linked to this
autobiographical purpose. If, however, the privacy interest is high, yet the
autobiographical interest is tangential or minimal, then there is room for the
privacy interest to prevail.
In determining the autobiographical justification of the speech, two
inquiries should be made that are drawn, in part, from the case law discussing
"newsworthiness." Was the speech, as a whole, truly autobiographical? And,
if so, was the personal information, including the person's actual name and
identifying information, sufficiently related to the autobiographical purpose of
the speech to warrant the invasion of privacy?
1. Does the Speech Have an AutobiographicalPurpose?
To discern whether one person's speech justifies violating another
person's information privacy because of its autobiographical purpose, the first
matter to resolve is whether the speech at issue is indeed autobiographical. Just
as "all information is arguably 'newsworthy' 296 or "political, 297 virtually all
speech can be described in some manner as "autobiographical." A news
reporter who overhears an account of the stranger's sexual tryst, for example,
logically could argue that that account is now part of his life story. Such a
broad definition of "autobiographical," however, trivializes the unique and
valuable category of speech that deserves protection.
Any attempt to define a category of speech is difficult and destined to be
imprecise. The definition of "political" speech, for example, which is famously
declared to be at the core of the First Amendment 29 8 is still much-debated and
subject to ongoing refinement. This is, as Lawrence Lessig described, "the
contingency of present First Amendment doctrine. 299 The problems with
296. Zimmerman, supra note 102, at 351.
297. West, supra note 12, at 924-26.
298. See Morse v. Frederick 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007) ("'Political speech,' of course, is
'at the core of what the First Amendment is designed to protect.'' (quoting Virginia v. Black,
538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003))); see also West, supra note 12, at 957 n.316 ("'[Tihere is a
practically universal agreement that a major purpose of [the First] Amendment was to protect
the free discussion of governmental affairs."' (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218
(1966))).
299. Lawrence Lessig, The Path of CyberLaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1753 (1995).
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defining autobiographical speech are no different. A definition that is too
broad will protect more speech than is necessary to further the goals of
autobiographical speech, while a definition that is too narrow leaves valuable
speech unprotected. Meanwhile, a definition that is too complex risks chilling
speech, while one that is too simple might be imprecise and vague. These are
the unavoidable intricacies of human communication, however, and must be
accepted in order to proceed. With these caveats and limitations in mind, I
offered in my earlier article this inaugural definition of autobiographical
speech: "[A]utobiographical speech is speech that is substantially related to the
story of the speaker's life and that a reasonable person would presume was
communicated with the primary intent of sharing information about the

speaker. 30

0

0

This definition attempts to capture the speech that should be protected
because of the value it contributes to the individual and to society while, at the
same time, setting forth limiting principles to exclude speech that does not
further these goals. The definition also pulls from existing case law .30 ' The
"substantially related" element requires that there be a significant nexus
between the information communicated and the speaker's life."
My proposed definition, however, also includes elements that reflect the
unique nature of autobiographical speech. For example, the definition requires
the speech to be about "the story of the speaker's life." The value of
autobiographical speech arises out of individuals choosing to truthfully share
their life experiences. The further the speech strays from this core purpose, the
less valuable it becomes as far as an instance of autobiographical speech.
Finally, the definition includes a requirement that "a reasonable person
would presume [the speech] was communicated with the primary intent of
sharing information about the speaker. 3 02 An inquiry into the intent of the
speaker can be a controversial proposition and, in some cases, the Supreme
Court has rejected this approach. In a criminal libel case, for example, the
Supreme Court rejected a standard found in many state laws, which limited the
defense of truth to only those "utterances published 'with good motives and for
justifiable ends."'3 03 The Court explained that public discourse will be harmed
if a speaker "must run the risk that it will be proved in court that he spoke out
300.

Id

301. See id ("This is borrowed in part from the law of privacy torts, which protects the
publication of facts that are substantially related to topics that are newsworthy or in the public
interest in order to prevent 'a morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake."'

(quoting RESTATEMENT
302.
303.

(SECOND) OF TORT-S

§ 652D cmt. h (1977))).

Id. at 960.
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 70 (1964) (citations omitted).
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of hatred.", 0 The Court further noted that "even if he did speak out of hatred,
utterances honestly believed contribute to the free interchange of ideas and the
ascertainment of truth.0 05 Likewise, the Court stated in a campaign finance
case that it is inappropriate to have a test based on the speaker's intent because
it "could lead to the bizarre result that identical ads aired at the same time could
be protected speech for one speaker, while leading to criminal penalties for
another.0 06 The Court further explained that "'First Amendment freedoms
need breathing space to survive.' An intent test provides none." 307 Martin
Redish agrees, claiming that "under well-accepted First Amendment doctrine, a
speaker's motivation is entirely irrelevant to the question of constitutional

protection.08
In other areas of speech, however, the Court repeatedly has allowed an
inquiry into the intent of the speaker to determine whether certain speech was
part of a constitutionally protected category. When faced with speech that is
arguably an unlawful incitement of violence, for example, the Court looks to
whether the advocacy was "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action. 3 09 In defamation cases, the Court will decide whether a false statement

was made knowingly or

not,310

and a speaker's "economic motivation"~ is a

factor in determining whether speech can be qualified as "commercial." 3 1 ' In
determining whether a public employee's speech is protected, the Court will
look to the purpose of the speech. The Seventh Circuit interpreted the Court's
test in Connick v. Myers312 as stating that "[tlhe test requires us to look at the
point of the speech in question: was it the employee's point to bring
wrongdoing to light? Or to raise other issues of public concern, because they
are of public concern? Or was the point to further some purely private

304.

Id at 73.

305.
306.

Id
FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 468 (2007).
Id. at 469 (quoting N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).

307.

308. MARTIN H. REDISH, MONEY TALKs: SPEECH, ECONOMIC POWER, AND THE VALUES OF
DEMOCRACY 91 (2001).
309. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
310. See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,279 (1964) ("The constitutional guarantees
require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was
made with 'actual malice' .... .
311. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 256 (Cal. 2002).
312. See id at 147-48 ("Whether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public
concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed
by the whole record.").
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interest?0 13
The Court has declared that a "true threat," moreover,
"encompass[es] those statements where the speaker means to communicate a
serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a
particular individual or group of individuals.0 14 The Court also examined the
speaker's motive when determining whether government speech violates the
Establishment Clause. 1 The Court explained:
The meaning of a statement to its audience depends both on the intention of
the speaker and on the "objective" meaning of the statement in the
commuity.... Examination of both the subjective and the objective
components of the message communicated by a government action is
therefore 316
necessary to determine whether the action carries a forbidden

meaning.

As discussed above, when individuals choose to speak truthfully and
publicly about their life experiences, their speech contributes significantly to
the public discourse and to their own personal growth. 1 It is these unique
values of intentional autobiographical speech that my work is attempting to
protect. Of course, speech undertaken for non-autobiographical purposes may
well be constitutionally protected, as the newsworthiness precedents reveal. 1 8
In addition, a privacy challenge might fail because it cannot establish all
elements of the claim .3 19 Those matters are outside the scope of this Article.
For my purposes, an inquiry into the intent of the speaker is helpful and,
313. Linhart v. Glatfelter, 771 F.2d 1004, 1010 (7th Cir. 1985); see also Martin v. Parrish,
805 F.2d 583, 585-86 (5th Cir. 1986) ("Appellant has not argued that his profanity was for any
purpose other than cussing out his students ... to 'motivate them.... [The] language is
unprotected ... because, taken in context, it constituted a deliberate, superfluous attack on a
'captive audience' with no academic purpose or justification."); Dambrot v. Cent. Mich. Univ.,
55 F.3d 1177, 1187 (6th Cir. 1995) ("The court must ask to what purpose the employee
spoke.").
314. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003).
315. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 (1984) (discussing whether a "secular
purpose" existed for including a nativity scene in a city's Christmas display).
316. Id at 690; cf.CAss R.Su1~sTEiN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 130
(1995) (suggesting that the definition of political speech is "when it is both intended and
received as a contribution to public deliberationabout some issue").
317. See supra Part IILA (arguing that autobiographical speech is worthy of protection
because among other things, it contributes to the public discourse).
318. See, e.g., Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222,1232 (7th Cir. 1993) ("People
who do not desire the limelight. ...
have no legal right to extinguish it if the experiences that
have befallen them are newswoty. .. .)
319. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTm § 652B (1977) ("One who intentionally
intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs
or concerns, is subject to liability to other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be
highly offensive to a reasonable person.").
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indeed, indispensable, in identifying the types of speech that are most deserving
of protection.
The intent of the speaker can be analyzed in two ways-subjectively and
objectively. A subjective approach would look to the actual intent of the
speaker regardless of how the speech was perceived by her audience. 2
Because of the inherent difficulty in discerning someone's thoughts, a
subjective intent test most likely would require courts or juries to defer to the
speaker's representation of whether the intent was autobiographical or not.
When it comes to deciding whether disclosure of a private fact is
newsworthy, many courts simply defer to the media .32 ' This approach has been

both lauded 322 and criticized .323 Deferring to the media to tell us what is and is
not newsworthy has its advantages. Most notably, it keeps the courts out of the
business of deciding the value of speech and making decisions that could
The media, it is assumed, has outside
amount to judicial censorship. 2
and
listeners to report on only matters that
pressures from its readers, viewers,
are of public interest, otherwise their business will fail .32 ' These checks on the
media might be insufficient when, however, "[w~hat is of interest to most of
326
society is not the same question as what is of legitimate public concern."
Warren and Brandeis most certainly would not have supported a "defer to the
320. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1441 (8th ed. 2004) (defining the subjective standard
as "[a] legal standard that is peculiar to a particular person and based on the person's views and
experiences").
321. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. g (1977) ("To a considerable
extent, in accordance with the mores of the community, the publishers and broadcasters have
themselves defined [newsworthiness], as a glance at any morning paper will confirm."); Kalven,
supra note 63, at 336 ("[Sjurely there is force to the simple contention that whatever is in the
news media is by definition newsworthy, that the press must in the nature of things be the final
arbiter of newsworthiness."). But see Gajda, supra note 239, at 1072 (arguing that "the modem
position of deference to journalists in the legal definition of newsworthiness, especially in
publication privacy cases" has been weakening in recent years).
322. See Volokh, supra note 20, at 1089 ("Under the First Amendment, it's generally not
the government's job to decide what subjects speakers and listeners should concern themselves
with.").
323. See Solove, supra note 9, at 1008 (stating that "the media should not have a monopoly
on determining what is of public concern").
324. See Heath v. Playboy Entm't, 732 F. Supp. 1145,1149 n.9 (S.D. Fla. 1990) ("[W]hat
is newsworthy is primarily a funrction of the publisher, not the courts."). The Fifth Circuit has
explained that judges "must resist the temptation to edit journalists aggessively... Exuberant
judicial blue-pencilling after-the-fact would blunt the quills of even the most honorable
journalists." Ross v. Midwest Commc'ns, Inc., 870 F.2d 271, 275 (5th Cur. 1989).
325. See Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 255 (1974) (stating that
privately owned newspapers are checked by "the acceptance of a sufficient number of readersand hence advertisers--to assure financial success").
326. Solove, supra note 9, at 1003.
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media" approach; they had little faith in the press's ability to know the line.3 2
They complained that "[t]he press is overstepping in every direction the
obvious bounds of propriety and of decency. Gossip is no longer the resource
of the idle and of the vicious but has become a trade, which is pursued with
28
industry as well as effrontery.0
Deferring to the autobiographical speaker to tell us whether speech is or is
not a necessary part of their life story is similarly flawed. Indeed, the potential
pitfalls of deferring to the speaker only intensify with autobiographical
speakers, who may lack profit motives and have no pressure to self-regulate.
For these reasons, an objective intent standard provides the proper
approach for dealing with autobiographical speakers. A standard that asks
whether a reasonable person would conclude that the speaker's primary intent
was to share information about the speaker effectively captures the speech that
furthers the valuable contributions of autobiographical speech while excluding
speech that, while arguably autobiographical, was spoken for an ulterior
motive. This approach also guards against efforts by speakers purposely to
inflict emotional harm on others by revealing personal information while
attempting to hide behind the "autobiographical speech" defense.
2. Is the Identifying Information Necessary to Furtherthe Autobiographical
Purpose?
Just because the speech is primarily autobiographical does not necessarily
suggest that someone should be free to broadcast another person's personal
information with impunity. The second part of the inquiry thus examines
whether the information is sufficiently linked to the autobiographical purpose to
warrant the invasion of privacy. More specifically, when are the plaintiffs
name and other identifying information necessary to further the
autobiographical purpose of the speech?
There is much to be drawn here from the courts' current approaches to the
newsworthiness inquiry, because many courts have demanded that there be a
link between the privacy plaintiff's personal information and the overall
"newsworthiness" of the speech before allowing the exemption. The Fifth and
Tenth Circuits, for example, ask whether "a logical nexus exist[s] between the
3 29
complaining individual and the matter of legitimate public interest.
327.
details in
328.
329.

See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 24, at 196 (discussing the press's use of salacious
its stories).
Id.
Id; see Gilbert v. Med. Econ. Co., 665 F.2d 305, 309 (10th Cir. 1981) (requiring
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Sometimes the inquiry is whether the private fact itself was a necessary part of
the overall newsworthy story. 330 But more often the question is whether the
plaintiff's name, photograph, or other identifying information was sufficiently
relevant to the newsworthiness of the speech to justify the intrusion on the
plaintiff's privacy. The California Supreme Court, for example, asks whether
the private facts disclosed by the speaker "were substantially relevant to the
3
segment's newsworthy subject matter." '
Frequently, courts have concluded that while the information in general
was newsworthy, the plaintiff's identifying information was not. 332 In one of
the most famous personal information cases, Melvin v. Reid,3 3 the California
Court of Appeals said that it was the use of the plaintiff's "true name in
connection with the true incidents from her life" that crossed the legal line of
privacy. 334 Merely using "those incidents from the life of appellant which were
spread upon the record of her trial," however, would not give rise to a cause of
action.3 3 In Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Association, 3 the California Supreme
Court held in similar fashion that "reports of the facts of past crimes are
newsworthy, 33 ' but "identification of the actor in reports of long past crimes
3 38
usually serves little independent public purpose.1
At times, however, courts have concluded that the media need to use
actual names and identifying information in order to substantiate their reporting
and thus "strengthen the impact and credibility of the article. 3 39 The Tenth
either "independent newsworthiness or any substantial nexus with a newsworthy topic").
330. See, e.g., Nobles v. Cartwright, 659 N.E.2d 1064, 1076 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) ("When
dealing with the disclosure of such allegedly 'private' fact about a plaintiff, courts generally
require an appropriate nexus or some sufficient degree of relatedness between the fact or
information disclosed and a matter which was... of legitimate public interest.").
33 1. Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 488 (Cal. 1998).
332. See Jared Lenow, Note, FirstAmendment Protectionfor the Publicationof Private
Information, 60 VAI4D. L. REv. 235, 272 n. 152 (2007) (gathering cases).
333. Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91, 93 (Cal. Ct. App. 193 1) (finding that the use of "unsavory"'
incidents in appellant's past life was not justified and was an invasion of appellant's right "to
pursue and obtain happiness").
3 34. Id.
335. Id.
336. See Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34, 43-44 (Cal. 197 1) (finding that a
complaint alleging that plaintiff's name was published in connection with criminal activity
eleven years after plaintiff's involvement stated a cause of action).
337. Idat39.
338. Id. at 40.
339. Gilbert v. Med. Econs. Co., 665 F.2d 305, 308 (10Oth Cir. 198 1); see also Ross v.
Midwest Commc'ns, Inc., 870 F.2d 271, 274 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding that reporting the identity
of an alleged rape victim was of "unique importance to the credibility and persuasive force of
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Circuit, for example, said that using a plaintiff's photograph and actual name
established that the issue was not merely hypothetical and "provid[es] an aura
of immediacy and even urgency that might not exist had plaintiff's name and
photograph been suppressed. 34 0 The Fifth Circuit agreed, stating that "[t]he
infamous Janet Cooke controversy (about the fabricated, Pulitzer-Prize winning
Washington Post series on the child-addict, Jimmy) suggests the legitimate
ground for doubts that may arise about the accuracy of a documentary that uses
34
only pseudonyms. " '
The analysis of when use of someone's actual name or other identifying
information is sufficiently linked to the autobiographical purpose of the speech
is very similar to the newsworthiness inquiry. 4 In some cases, the use of this
identifying information is only tangentially related to the autobiographical
nature of the speech, so that requiring the speaker to omit it would not
significantly affect the speaker's autobiographical goals. Yet, in other cases,
asking the speaker to leave out this information would so fundamentally alter
the story that the speaker no longer would be accounting truthfully about her
life experiences, or the omission could give the appearance that her story is
fabricated.
The most common way to shield a plaintiffs identity would be for the
speaker to use a pseudonym. One problem with requiring the use of
pseudonyms is that they are not always effective. Consider the subject of Judge

Posner's decision in Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, InC.3 43 -Ruby Lee Daniels.
She was the protagonist of author Nicholas Lemann's historical study of the
black migration north in his book, The PromisedLand.3 44 Daniels spoke to the
historian about her personal experiences willingly and truthfully.345 She told of
the disastrous effects of the government's policies on her relationship with her
then-husband Luther Haynes. 4 In his analysis, Judge Posner discussed the
possibility that Lehman could have used a pseudonym instead of Haynes's real

the story"); Howard v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 283 N.W.2d 289,303 (Iowa 1979)
(finding that the use of actual names of persons who were involuntarily sterilized
"strengthen[ed] the accuracy of the public perception of the merits of the controversy").
340. Gilbert, 665 F.2d at 308.
341. Ross, 870 F.2d at 274.
342. See, e.g., Gilbert, 665 F.2d at 309 (requiring "either independent newsworthiness or
any substantial nexus with a newsworthy topic").
343. Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222 (7th Cir. 1993).
344. NicHOLAS LEMANN, THE PROMISED LAND: THE GREAT BLACK MIGRATION AND How IT
CHANGED AMERICA

345.
346.

(Vintage Books 199 1).

Haynes, 8 F.3d at 1227.
Id at 1230.

THE STOR Y OF US64

645

name.3 47 But the effort, Judge Posner concluded, would have been futile.34 He
explained: "The details of the Hayneses' lives recounted in the book would
identify them unmistakably to anyone who has known the Hayneses well for a
long time (members of their families, for example), or who knew them before
they got married. . ..
Indeed, the scenario Judge Posner described is precisely what occurred in
Bonome v. Kaysen. 30In that case, the author Susana Kayseni did not reveal her
live-in boyfriend's name, but rather referred to him throughout the book simply
as "my boyfiend."3 5 1 She also changed certain potentially identifying
information about him such as his occupation and hometown. 5 Despite these
efforts to hide his identity, her boyfriend's friends, family, and business
contacts were able to identify him as the person depicted in the book.3 5
Thus, in some cases the use of pseudonyms will not be effective because
too many people will be able to identify the plaintiff. In order to hide the
plaintiffs identity successfully, the speaker would need to change numerous
details about the person and the incident being discussed. But such significant
alteration of identifying information could alter the speaker's true story so
much that it becomes more fabrication than fact. Judge Posner came to this
conclusion in the Haynes case, noting that forcing an historian to change
identifying information about one of his subjects would mean that eventually
"he would no longer have been writing history. He would have been writing

fiction. 3 54

If a requirement to conceal all potentially identifying information about
the plaintiff is taken too far, moreover, there is a risk that the autobiographical
speaker will be unable to tell her story at all. Again, this was the case with
Kayser.
She wished to write about the effects that her medical condition had
on her long-term, intimate relationship with her former boyfriend. 516 Yet there
was really no way for her to tell this part of her life story without disclosing at
347. Id. at 1233.
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. See Bonome v. Kaysen, No. 032767,2004 WL 1194731, at *1 (Mass. Super. Mar. 3,
2004) (reviewing an invasion of privacy action against an author of a memoir).
351. Id.
352. Id
353. Id. at *2.
354. Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1233 (7th Cir. 1993).
355. See Bonome, 2004 WL 119473 1, at *4-.5 (balancing the plaintiff's interest in privacy
with the defendant's First Amendment rights).
356. Id. at *2.
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least some identifying information about him. If she faced liability for
including any potentially identifying information, then she would likely be
forced not to speak at all.35
Thus, in some autobiographical speech cases there will be a legitimate
autobiographical purpose and no effective way to conceal the plaintiff's identity
without compromising the speaker's ability to tell her story. In these cases, the
autobiographical speaker's right to speak truthfully must prevail. But there
remain other instances where the use of pseudonyms or altered identifying
information would be effective at protecting the plaintiff and the changes would
not interfere significantly with the autobiographical nature of the speech. These
are the cases where the plaintiff s privacy interest can and should be recognized
and given force.
Take, for example, the Capitol Hill staffer Jessica Cutler."' 8 While she
attempted to hide the identities of the men in her life by not using their names
and by writing anonymously, her efforts were exceedingly simple and easily
decipherable. 5 She used their real initials and offered bits of information
about their jobs, religions, and families. 360 This proved to be sufficient
information for amateur internet sleuths to uncover the identities of the men . 36 '
The identifying information was not necessary to Cutler's autobiographical
purpose of sharing her myriad relationship experiences. Indeed, it is possible
that she could have hidden their identities even if she had not written
anonymously. 3 62 A standard that looks to whether the identifying information
was necessary for the speaker to tell her story will require speakers like Cutler
to be more diligent about protecting the identities of those they discuss. But it
also protects speakers ex ante, thus reducing the risk of a chilling effect, if they
take steps to reveal only identifying information that is necessary to tell their
357. See id. ("Because the First Amendment protects Kaysen's ability to contribute her
own personal experiences to the public discourse on important and legitimate issues of public
concern, disclosing Bonome's involvement in those experiences is a necessary incident
thereto.').
358. See The Story of the Washingtonienne, supra note 48, at (May 5, 2004, 5:32 p.m.)
(republishing the Washingtonienne blog created by Jessica Cutler).
359. See id. at (May 11, 2004,2:21 p.m.) (describing each man by their initials and nature
of their employment).
360. Id
361. See April Witt, Blog Interrupted, WASH. POST MAO., Aug. 15, 2004, at 13-14
(describing how "amateur Internet sleuths. ...
searched electronic databases looking for likely
suspects, then posted names and photographs on the Internet").
362. See Solove, supra note 64, at 1199 ("Jessica certainly has a right to speak about her
life, but she should do it more carefully by concealing the identities of the people she blogs
about.").
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story. The end result is that the plaintiffs' privacy interests are protected yet the
speakers still can share their stories.
Whether a speaker takes steps to conceal identifying information about
others can play another important role in this analysis by providing insight into
the speaker's intent. 6 Efforts by the speaker to hide the plaintiff's identity,
whether successful or not, can show that the speaker's primary intent was to
share information about himself and not about the plaintiff. The Kaysen case
is, again, an example.3 Susana Kaysen could not completely conceal her
former boyfriend's identity and still tell her story, but she nonetheless chose to
reveal only the smallest amount of identifying information about him that was
necessary. 365 Her efforts suggest that it was not her intent to expose him or
subject him to "urnecessary publicity or attention. "366 The court in Bonome v.
Kaysen recognized the importance of Kaysen's choices and noted that
Kaysen's efforts to conceal his identity reduced the extent of his exposure and,
367
therefore, the harm to him.
Thus, in addition to establishing whether the speaker was speaking with an
autobiographical purpose, courts should inquire whether the use of the
plaintiff's name or other identifying information was necessary to further that
purpose. If it is not necessary, the burden can be placed on the speaker to take
efforts to conceal the plaintiff s identity. Using the speaker's efforts to hide the
plaintiff s identity as evidence of a true autobiographical intent, moreover, will
incentivize speakers to reveal only identifying information if it is necessary for
them to tell their story.
C The Benefits of the Justi~fied DisclosureApproach
The justified disclosure approach picks up where the current legal system
and other potential frameworks break down. Under current law, there is a risk
that many truthful autobiographical stories will be silenced because of an
overemphasis on the "newsworthiness" inqur. 38Identifying these speakers,
363. See supra Part IV.B. 1 (discussing the relevance of the speaker's intent with respect to
an autobiographical purpose).
364. See Bonome v. Kaysen, No. 032767,2004 WL 119473 1, at *1 (Mass. Super. Mar. 3,
2004) (explaining that Kaysen did not reveal her boyfriend's name in her book but referred to
him only as her "boyfriend" as well as changing his hometown and occupation).
365. Id
366. Id at *7.
367. Id.
368. See supra Part II.C (examining the overemphasis on "newsworthiness" in the tort of
public disclosure of private facts).
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while excluding those with non-autobiographical motives, protects both their
constitutional rights and their unique contributions to the public discourse.
This approach, however, leaves room to recognize the privacy interests of
individuals who could be harmed by unwanted publicity in cases where the
speech was not primarily autobiographical or where their identities were not
necessary to the autobiographical purpose of the speech.
The traditional focus on "newsworthiness" when dealing with public
disclosure cases allows courts to punish truthful, but non-newsworthy,
autobiographical speech-an approach that is constitutionally unsound. 6
Because the Constitution does not exclude all non-newsworthy speech from the
protections of the First Amendment, adhering to the "newsworthiness"
framework could be fatal for the tort. The justified disclosure approach,
however, solves this problem by separating the constitutionally valuable speech
from the more harmful unjustified disclosures. This analysis is in line with the
majority of the case law in which courts have concluded that it is not "highly
offensive" under the tort to have personal information disclosed if it is for a

sufficient reason.

370

Through their interpretation of what is "highly offensive" to a reasonable
person, courts are reflecting community norms and expectations. The courts
have concluded, for example, that it is highly offensive to have personal
information revealed for purely voyeuristic reasons.3 7 In this way, the justified
disclosure approach has many of the same benefits of Richards's and Solove's
duty of confidentiality framework. 372 Yet it also has the advantage of being
more predictable ex ante than the complex, fact-based analysis that is inherent

369. See supra Part I1.C (arguing that the tort of public disclosure of private facts maybe
in violation of the Constitution because free speech is left unprotected).
370. See, e.g., Hlaynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th Cir. 1993) (finding
newsworthiness might be a sufficient justification for public disclosure of "highly offensive"
information); Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cos., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1182, 1190 (D.
Ariz. 1998) (suggesting that if "offensive" information is newsworthy, it might "mitigate the
offensiveness of the intrusion"); Bonome v. Kaysen, No. 032767, 2004 WL 119473 1, at *7
(Mass. Super. Mar. 3, 2004) (finding that "offensive" personal information may be revealed if it
shares a nexus with a matter of legitimate public concern); Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc.,
955 P.2d 469, 493 (Cal. 1998) (concluding that an invasion of a person's privacy might be less
"offensive" when done "in pursuit of a socially or politically important story").
371. See, e.g., Haynes, 8 F.3d at 1232 (identify'ing the appropriate goal as preventing "the
publication of intimate personal facts when the community has no interest in them beyond the
voyeuristic thrill of penetrating the wall of privacy that surrounds a stranger").
372. See Richards & Solove, supra note 201 (arguing that courts should impose a duty of
confidentiality on intimate relationships to resolve disputes regarding embarrassing information
acquired during the relationship).
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in a duty of confidentiality framework .373 It involves only a two-step inquiry
into the objectively autobiographical intent of the speaker and the link between
the plaintiffs identity and the autobiographical purpose of the speech. A
would-be autobiographical speaker, moreover, can protect himself ex ante by
taking every reasonable step to conceal the identities of others and only reveal
as little personal information about others as is necessary to tell his story. This
approach is also arguably fairer because no factfmrder will have the power to
judge the value of the speech-only whether the identifying information was
necessary to further an objectively autobiographical purpose.
And while the justified disclosure approach favors the speaker, it remains
respectful of the significant information privacy interest at stake and provides
real, if limited, privacy protection. Privacy plaintiffs can prevail under this
framework if they can establish that the disclosure of their personal information
was unjustified and thus highly offensive or, in the case of autobiographical
speech, if they can show that their identifying information was not necessary to
fuirther the atobiographical purpose.
This Article is focused on resolving the autobiographical speech versus
information privacy conflict, but the justified disclosure approach promises to
be useful in a number of speech-versus-privacy disputes. Its focus on the
reason for the disclosure and its goal of identifying and punishing emotionally
harmful yet unjustified disclosures such as pure voyeurism potentially has a
much broader application.
V Conclusion
There are few things more valuable to human beings than our own life
experiences-they embody our fondest memories, our deepest shames, our
greatest fears and our most enduring loves. We all wish to control these stories
and decide for ourselves if, when, how, and to whom they will be revealed.
Some of us find it cathartic to share them broadly, while others of us wish to
hold them close. Sometimes these conflicting desires are irreconcilably at odds.
The best approach to the autobiographical speech versus information
privacy dilemma is to recognize the inherent value of speaking about life
experiences while, at the same time, remaining aware of the potential harms
some public disclosures bring. Both autobiographical speech and information
privacy promote individual autonomy and foster our democracy. Yet prior
373. See id. at 157 ("Courts have found the existence of such a duty [of confidentiality] by
looking to the nature of the relationship between the parties, by reference to the law of
fiduciaries, or by finding an implied contract of confidentiality.").
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attempts to balance the two significant interests have failed. Privacy and
speech are not property rights that we own, sell, and trade. And it would be a
complicated legal fiction to say that we have undeclared contracts with each
other about when to speak and when to stay quiet.
What we do have, however, are shared understandings about when it is
acceptable to disclose personal information about others and when it is highly
offensive. The courts, through an interpretation of the tort of public disclosure,
have begun to recognize this by declaring that it is not highly offensive to a
reasonable person to have private information revealed for a sufficient
justification. Pure voyeurism, the courts have concluded, is not a sufficient
reason to inflict the emotional harm of a public disclosure on an individual. 7
Sharing newsworthy information is a sufficient justification as is, I submit,
engaging in truthful autobiographical speech. In addition to resolving the
autobiographical speech versus information privacy face-off, this approach
promises to be applicable to a broad range of speech versus privacy disputes.

374. See, e.g., Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 493 (Cal. 1998) (observing
that disclosures that satisfy' nothing more than "prurient curiosity" are not protected).
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